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Two experiments are reported which deal with the effect of the
S3nitactic form of a sentence on the reaction time (RT) of a true-
false response to the sentence. Experiment one was a replication
at a study by Collins and Quillian (1969) which supported a quasi-
hierarchical conception of semantic memory. Sentences used in ex-
periment one varied in their truth value, hierarchical level, and
type of information presented. Each sentence was presented for
true-false classification and RT was the response measure. The
results supported the Collins and Quillian model. Experiment two
was done to try to separate the effect of the syntactic form of the
sentence from its semantic content. RT to sentences which express
similar ideas, but in different syntactic forms, was measured. The
results indicated that different kinds of semantic information, su-
perset and property, are stored in different syntactic forms in
memory.
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1The topic of this paper is semantic memory. Semantic memory
refers to the nature and the structure of the information which people
know about words. In lingiiistics this problem is generally referred
to as the nature of the lexicon or one's mental dictionary.
Tulving (1972) argued that the problems of semantic memory
differ from those which have traditionally defined the area of verbal
learning and memory. A brief summary of Tulving 's position v/ill be
presented to relate the present experiments to previous research.
Traditional studies of memory have been concerned with episodic
memory. Tulving (1972) proposed that episodic and semantic memory
"differ from one another in terms of (a) the nature of the stored
information, (b) autobiographical versus cognitive reference,
(c) conditions and consequences of retrieval, and probably also in
terms of (d) their vulnerability to interference resulting in trans-
formation and erasure of stored information, and (e) their dependence
upon each other [p. 385]."
Episodic memory consists of information about events or episodes
in space and time which are part of an individual's experience. Epi-
sodic memory consists of autobiographical events. A list of nonsense
syllables or words is a temporal sequence of events which the individual
remembers as having been shown to him two minutes ago in an experimental
room. It is a sequence of events which he experienced. Furthermore,
episodic memory is not inferential or productive. The individual
remembers only those events which happened to him. In reference to
forgetting, Tulving (1972) suggested that the contents of episodic
memoiy are probably more susceptible to forgetting due to loss of
2spatial and temporal cues about the event than are the contents of
semantic memory. Interference and decay theories of forgetting have
been relevant to episodic memory.
'Eulving (1972) defined semantic memory as "the memory necessary
for the use of language. It is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge
a person possesses about words and the other verbal symbols, their
meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about rules,
formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, con-
cepts, and relations [p. 386]." In contrast to episodic memory,
semantic memory is not autobiographical, is inferential and productive,
and is probably less subject to forgetting. The information about a
nation's capital city, for example, might constitute part of semantic
memory.
Tulving (1972) also argued that much recent research has been
concerned with the interaction of the two systems. For example,
recent studies have been concerned with the free recall of word lists
where specific semantic relationships, like hierarchical groupings,
exist among the words (for example. Bower, Clark, Lesgold, and
Winzenz, 1969). According to Tulving 's analysis, these studies have
been concerned with how Ss use information in semantic memory, in
order to have accurate episodic memory. The emphasis of the research,
however, has been on the processes which underlie accurate recall,
rather than on the structure of semantic memory.
Tulving 's distinction was accepted and used as a justification
for omitting discussion of the free recall literature where semantic
variables have been investigated.
3While the writer accepted Tulving's (1972) distinction for its
usefulness in narrowing the scope of the problem, there is one point
which should he mentioned before considering some of the semantic
memory models which have been proposed.
The problem is that there is a lack of agreement among theorists
as to what knowledge is being modeled. In Tulving's (1972) definition,
semantic memory is about our knowledge of verbal or linguistic
symbols. Kintsch (1972) in introductory remarks about his own semantic
memory model, stated that he was "concerned merely with the structure
of a person's vocabulary, not his 'model of the world'. In other
words, the empirical truth, falsity, likelihood, etc., of statements
are irrelevant for present purposes. In terms of the distinction
between pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic factors, we are only
dealing with the latter two [p. 2hQ]/^
Others have felt that their models have broader generality.
They were concerned with modeling one's "knowledge of the world"
rather than Just modeling one's knowledge of words. Quillian (1969)
writing of a computer program which could, read limited verbal material,
stated: "'Comprehending' text is here defined as the relating of
assertions made or implied in that text to information previously
stored as part of the comprehender ' s general ' knowledge of the world '
.
Correspondingly, the central aim of . . . the model is the ability to
appropriately relate text to the correct pieces of stored general
knowledge of the world [p. ii6o]."
In a paper on the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, Greeno
(1972) noted "the papers ... in this volume provide important general
4analyses of the way in which knowledge is stored in the mind. These
papers dealing with semantic memory have dealt primarily with
linguistic knowledge and knowledge about the world that is described
in sentences. However, there is a sense of the term 'semantics'
that refers to conceptual structures in a general way [p. 375]."
Collins and Quillian's Model of Semantic Memory
The impetus for the present paper was a semantic memory model
proposed by Quillian (1967, 1968, 1969). Quillian's model concerns
the organization of semantic information in memory and its subsequent
retrieval. Quillian (1967) stated that the model is limited in that
it "is not at present intended to handle all kinds of information
that people presumably store in their heads. It is designed to hold
only denotative, factual information
. . . [p. i+lO]."
Semantic memory is conceptualized as a network of unidirectionally
associated nodes. Each node may be considered as either a word or a
set of property elements (features). The network is structured by the
type of associations existing between nodes.
The definition of any word in memory begins with a node referred
to as a type node. The type node is the word to be defined. Coming
out of the type node or name word is a set of pointers to other nodes.
These other nodes are called tokens. The associations from the type
node to its tokens, and from token to token, define the name word.
Among the tokens defining a word, there must first be one token which
refers to a superset of the type node. Other token nodes refer to
specific properties of the type node.
5Figure 1 shows three t^^-pe nodes, "plant," "tree," and "oak"
and their token nodes. For the type node "tree" there is one token
node for superset or superordinate information, i.e., "plant." Other
taken nodes branching out of "plant," "branches" and "has leaves,"
give the characteristics specific to "tree."
Insert Figxrre 1 about here
While the token nodes defining "tree" may occur in the definition
of other words, the definition of any of these tokens occurs once.
For example, "branch" may occur as a token in the definition of either
"tree" or "river." As a type node, however, "branch" occurs once. For
each occurrence of "branch" as a token node, there is a pointer or
association which feeds into the type node for "branch."
Associations, then, are type-to-token and token-to-token, with
an additional association from each token referring back to its own
type node. This type-token-type structure reduces the amount of stored
information, because tokens are defined only once, and not every time
they occur as tokens.
Spatially, Quillian (1967) conceptualized the model as a set of
planes. A type node with pointers to its token nodes exists in one of
these planes. In going from a token to its type node, one moves into a
new plane. This new plane consists of a type node and pointers to all
its token nodes.
Two interesting characteristics of the model are its
q;uasi-hierarchical structure and its nonredundant coding of property
6information. One can trace the supersets which follow from each type
node to define a hierarchy of superordinate terms. In Figure 1, there
is a hierarchy of nouns: "oak"—"tree"—"plant"~"structure . " The
system is only quasi
-hierarchical because there is always the potential
for a higher order token to loop back down to a lower level in the
hierarchy. In a more recent discussion of the model, Collins and
Quillian ( 1972b) have stated that the hierarchical chains probably do
not extend for more than three or four steps.
Related to the hierarchical structure is the idea that property
information is stored in a nonredundant manner. Conrad (1972) has
referred to this characteristic as cognitive economy. In Figure 1,
note that even though the properties of "having roots," "having
branches," etc., are true of oaks, these properties are not directly
stored with the definition of "oak." Properties are generally stored
with the highest level type node of which they are true. In short, one
knows that an oak has roots indirectly, or through knowing that an oak
is a tree, a tree is a plant, and that a plant has roots.
In a recent discussion of the model; Collins and Quillian (1972b)
qualified this assumption of nonredundancy. They stated that properties
of a superset word may be stored with a subset word, and that the degree
to which this occurs depends on the conditions of learning the meaning
of both words.
There are other characteristics of the model which are important
for the present experiment.
7Quillian (1967, 1969) stated that concepts, rather than word
definitions are being represented. Concepts are distinguished from
word definitions in that word definitions include only the information
presented in one plane, i.e., a type node and its tokens. Concepts,
on the other hand, may require a configuration of several type nodes
and their tokens to be fully represented. Furthermore, some concepts
might not have names. One may be able to define a concept in one
plane, but there may be no one word in English which stands for that
definition. Conversely, there may be several words which have the
same definition, as with synonyms. Although Collins and Quillian ( 1972b)
did not state this specifically, they seemed to imply that synonymous
terms occupy the same type node.
Besides the structure of the information, another important aspect
of the model is the form of the information. As has already been
stated, the type node is directly associated with a token which defines
its superset. This superset is then followed by a set of tokens in a
particular configuration wliich shows how the superset must be modified
in order to define the type node. The format of the word tokens is
also of concern. In tiying for greater economy of storage, all words
are represented in canonical form (Quillian, 1967). Presumably, the
most lexically simple form of a word is used. This is done both to
reduce redundancy, and because the model is concerned with representing
conceptual information rather than with Just defining words. Quillian
(1967) wrote: "Here it will only be noted that in encoding dictionary
definitions all gramniatical inflections . . . vanish, that is do not
become nodes themselves but instead dictate that various range-
restricting tags be appended to the token nodes of certain other
words. Removing all inflections during encoding permits all nodes in
the memory model to represent canonical forms of words
. . . [p. )+l9]."
For example, Collins and Quillian ( 1972b) remarked that "noun
and verb forms of the same word must refer to the same concept
. . . and
should be treated similarly [p. 317]." However, they did not specify
what they mean by treating noun and verb forms of the same concepts
similarly. In Quillian (1967), there was an example of a concept which
can be realized as either a noun or a verb, i.e., "plant." However,
the definitions of the noun and verb forms of this concept were not
specially marked to show the similarity. In this case, there were three
planes for each of the three meanings of "plant." (Plant as a building
is the third meaning given. ) The only indication of the conceptual
similarity between "plant" as a verb and "plant" as a noun was the
notation that there are three meanings of "plant." Since there were
separate definitions for the various meanings of the word, there is no
economy of storage in this case.
The failure to note the conceptual similarity of the two nodes,
and to achieve economy of storage, may, however, merely have been a
function of this particular example. It may also have been due to the
fact that this particular example comes from an earlier statement of
the model. The model may have been modified subsequent to the Quillian
(1967) paper in a way that would emphasize conceptual similarity.
9Experimental Tests of the Model
The hypothesis of a nonredundant, hierarchical structure of memory
has been tested by studying reaction time (RT) to true and false sentences
(Collins and Quillian, 1969). Since the model specifies how information
is organized, given some additional assumptions about how memory will
be searched, the model predicts that sentence RT is a function of the
number of nodes which separate the stored representations of the subject
and predicate terms in memory.
Referring to Figure 1, consider the time required to respond
"true" to (l) "An oak has acorns", and (2) "An oai has branches."
Information relevant to the first sentence is stored as a token node
under "oak" along with other properties specific to oaks. Properties
of oaks as trees, however, are not stored under the type node "oak,"
but under the type node "tree." Therefore, making a "true" response
to sentence (2) requires moving from the type node "oak" to the type
node "tree." Since this decision requires traveling through an addi-
tional level of the hierarchy, RT should increase because of the
additional nodes searched.
Before summarizing the method and results of the Collins and
Quillian (1969) experiment, a discrepancy in the models presented in
the various papers should be noted.
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the two kinds of memory networks which
have been proposed. In Figure 1, based on Quillian (1967), each
imderlined word is a type node. The pointers from the type node are to
superset tokens and property tokens. Coming out of each token node
is the pointer to its type node indicated by the dashed arrow. In
10
moving from the token to its type, one moves to another plane or level.
The important thing to note about the first model is that the informa-
tion needed to respond "true" to "An oak is a tree," does not require
moving to another plane or level. Superset information is present as
a token within the plane of the type node.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 shows the model presented in Collins and Quillian (1969).
The memory net has been simplified in this paper. The type-token
distinction is only implicit, and the hierarchical organization of
words is emphasized rather than the movement to another plane. Non-
redundant coding of information is clear, however. Note that deciding
"true" to "An oak is a tree" requires moving up one level to another
plane.
While the two models do not necessarily differ in predictions
on RT, they do differ in tems of sentence classification and in where
superset information is located. The implications of using the
Quillian (1967) model to interpret the data of Collins and Quillian (1969)
are presented later.
Ss' task in Collins and Quillian (1969) was to make true-false
judgments about sentences that predicate property or superset relation-
ships. Table 1 shows a sample set of the sentences used, based on the
semantic hierarchy of words shown in Figure 2. P and S refer to
property and superset relations, respectively. The 0, 1, and 2 follow-
ing the S and P designate the number of levels which must be traveled
11
tefore the relevant information is found. Judgment on SO sentences
involves an identity operation and should require no search other than
Insert Table 1 about here
finding the initial node, i.e., recognizing the word. Judgment about
SI sentences requires moving up one level to retrieve relevant infor-
mation, and Judgment about S2 sentences moving up two levels to retrieve
relevant information. In PO sentences, "acorns," for example, is
present at the same level as "oak". Judgment about PI sentences requires
moving up one level, and on P2 sentences moving up two levels.
A consistent increase in RT to true sentences from level 0 to
level 1, and from level 1 to level 2 v/as predicted. The same increase
should hold for property and superset relation sentences. Furthermore,
if property search is assumed to be dependent upon first reaching the
superset name, then property relation sentences should have longer RTs
than superset relation sentences. More specific assumptions regarding
search strategies are discussed later.
Three experiments were run to test the model. In each experiment
Ss were presented with sets of true and false sentences. The sentences
were from either two- or three-level hierarchies, (in a two-level
hierarchy, P2 and S2 sentences were omitted. ) A typical hierarchy of
sentences is shown in Table 1, except that instead of using "oak" in
each sentence, names of different trees were used. Eight to twelve
hierarchies of different semantic content were used.
12
Across the three experiments, false sentences were constructed
in one of two ways. The first method, illustrated Idj the sentences in
Table 2, involved predicating false properties and categories to the
tree names. The false properties and categories were selected without
regard to level of contradiction. For example, "A dogwood is lazy"
Insert Table 2 about here
is false because laziness contradicts a property of plants. The other
two false property sentences in Table 2 are false because they contradict
properties of particular trees, "hemlock" and "poplar." Therefore, under
this method of constructing false sentences, false sentences are grouped
together regardless of the level of the hierarchy at which the contra-
diction occurs.
The second method for constructing false sentences is illustrated
by the sentences in Table 3 and the memory net in Figure 3. This
Insert Table 3 about hete
Insert Figure 3 about here
method controlled for the level of contradiction. The PO sentence
shown in Table 3 is false because it contradicts a property of oaks.
The PI sentence shown contradicts a property of trees, and the P2
13
sentence contradicts a property of plants. Thus, there is a consistent
increase in the level of contradiction.
Superset sentences were always of the syntactic form: "A (noun)
is a (noun)." Property relation sentences were of one of the following
facms: "A (noun) can (verb)," "A (noun) has (noun)," and "A (noun) is
( adj ective ) ,
"
Sentences were presented in blocks of 32 to 48. Each sentence
appeared for two seconds, followed by a blank screen for two seconds.
Ss pressed one of two response buttons to indicate "true" or "false."
The results for true sentences were that property relation
sentences had consistently higher RTs than superset relation sentences
for all levels. There was a fairly constant increase of 75 msec. This
75 msec, difference was interpreted as the time required to move from
a node to its superset. The prediction of two parallel straight lines
was confirmed except for one divergent point for SO sentences. RT to
SO sentences was below the point predicted by parallel lines. This
effect was attributed to Ss responding to SO sentences as a pattern
matching task rather than as a sentence comprehension task. Ss respond
to the subject and predicate nouns of SO sentences as visual patterns
rather than understand them as words.
The average increase in RT from SI to PI and from S2 to P2 was
225 msec. This constant was considered to represent the time needed to
retrieve a property from the level where it is stored.
The retrieval process indicated by the results for true sentences
is a combination of parallel and serial processing. S starts at the
initial category node and begins searching properties at level 0. If
14
the Information is present, the average time to complete the property-
search is 225 msec. Whether the property search at any level is
exhaustive or self-terminating cannot be determined from this experi-
ments Simiiltaneously with the property search of level 0, S is moving
to level 1, and in 75 msec, reaches the level 1 superset node. Property
search of level 1 then begins. Thus, there is simultaneous search of
level 0 and 1 properties, except that the search of level 0 began 75
msec earlier and, therefore, should end 75 msec, earlier. Seventy-five
msec, after level 1 property search begins, S reaches the level 2 super-
set node and begins searching properties at level 2. Search of level 2
properties occurs simultaneously with search of level 0 and level 1,
except that search of level 2 is 75 msec, behind that of level 1, and
150 msec, behind that of level 0.
Search is serial because S must pass through each superset node
before the property search can begin at that level. Furthermore, Ss
cannot skip nodes. Processing is parallel because property search occurs
at several levels sim.ultaneously, with 75 msec, lags between levels.
Movement through the superset nodes occurs at the same time as lower
level property search continues.
The results of the study can also be interpreted in terms of the
Quillian (1967) model. This involves reinterpreting the level at
which superset information is retrieved. In Figure 1, it can be seen
that "An oak is a tree" would be classified as an SO sentence. All
the information for the decision is in one plane. In Figure 2, it
can be seen that "An oak is a tree" would be classified as an SI
sentence because the relevant information is in two planes.
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Similarly sentences classified as S2 by Collins and Quillian
(1969) are reclassified as SI sentences using the model in Quillian
(1967). To respond "true" to "An oak is a plant" requires moving up one
level to the type node "tree" in Figure 1. In this plane, one can re-
trieve the information that a tree is a plant and that, therefore, an
oak is a plant.
Classification of property relation sentences with regard to
level of retrieval does not change using the Quillian (1967) model.
One result of using the Quillian (1967) model to interpret the
Collins and Quillian (1969) data is to reduce the difference in RT
between property and superset sentences. Sentences previously classi-
fied as SI are now SO, and S2 sentences are now SI. Therefore, the
original difference of 225 msec, between property and superset relation
sentences is now reduced by 75 msec, the change in RT between levels.
The resulting difference of 150 msec, between SO and PO, and SI
and PI, is now interpreted as the time required to retrieve a property
from a node once the superset information has been retrieved. The 75
msec, increase between levels is the time required to travel between
the superset tokens of each type node.
Referring to Figure 1, if S responds "true" to "An oak is a tree,"
this indicates that S has retrieved the "tree" token under "oak." If
that decision took, say 1000 msec, then in 1075 msec, S can respond
•^true" to "An oak is a plant," indicating he has retrieved the "plant"
token under "tree." Thus, 75 msec, is the time required to travel
between superset tokens of the type nodes.
16
Again, if S responds "true" to "An oak is a tree," this indicates
S has retrieved the "tree" token under "oak." If this decision took
1000 msec, then in 1150 msec, S can respond "true" to "An oak has
acorns." The difference in RT of 150 msec, between the SO and PO
sentences, is the time to retrieve other property tokens, once the
superset token has been retrieved.
Probably, one can apply the Quillian (1967) model to the Collins
and Quillian (1969) data in other ways. For example, one can assume
that S cannot respond "true" to "An oak is a tree" until he reaches
the "tree" type node. This kind of assumption would be inconsistent
with the assumptions made about retrieval of other properties,
however. One can see that by simplifying the model to that shown in
Figure 2, the interpretation of the data becomes simpler.
A study by Collins and Quillian ( 1970b) provided some additional
support for the model shown in Figure 2. This is the model tested by
Collins and Quillian (1969) where the superset information is retrieved
by moving up the hierarchy, and the properties specific to a type node
are directly associated v/ith it. In the earlier model, (Quillian,
1967, 1968, 1969) the properties specific to a type node are retrieved
only after retrieving the superset of the type node (see Figure l).
^
In this particular experiment, the locus of the superset infor-
mation is important in makir^ predictions about retrieval. Collins
and Quillian ( 1970b) assumed that, if in retrieving information from
the network, a particular pathway is used, then that pathway is
momentarily more accessible. Assume that the sentence ".An oak has
branches" is presented for true-false classification. In searching
17
the hierarchy, depicted in Figure 2, S uses the path from "oak"
to "tree" to retrieve the information that trees have branches.
This inference should make the "oak" to "tree" pathway temporarily
more accessible. If S_ is now shown the sentence "An oak is a tree,"
RT should be faster relative to some control condition where the path
from "oak to "tree" had not been previously activated.
The sentences used in this study were similar to those used in
the previous study (Collins and Quillian, 1969), except that pairs of
sentences with the same subject noun were used. Eight combinations
of PO, PI and SI sentences were used. A PO sentence was preceded by
a PO, PI, or SI. A PI was preceded by a PO, PI, or SI. SI sentences
were preceded by either a PO or PI sentence.
Trial 1 data for PO, PI, and SI sentences replicated the results
of Collins and Quillian (1969) with one divergence. There was very
little difference between PO and SI sentences in RT. This result is
interesting because for both of these sentences, the information to
be retrieved is one step away from the initial node. This result
indicated that it is the number of steps traveled in the hierarchy
that alone determines RT, and not also the difference between superset
and property relations. In the Collins and Quillian (1969) study, the
RT to SI sentences was about 125 msec, faster than the RT to PO
sentences.
Collins and Quillian (1970b) made eight predictions about the
conditional RTs. All the RT differences obtained were in the pre-
dicted direction; however, only five were significant. For example,
it was found that RT to SI sentences was significantly faster when
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the SI sentence had been preceded by a PI sentence, in contrast to
VThen the SI sentence had been preceded by a PO sentence. That is,
it was easier to respond "true" to "An oak is a tree" when the sentence
had been preceded by "An oak has branches," than when it had been
preceded by "An oak has acorns."
Of the five significant effects, it should be noted that these
effects were reduced when the data were adjusted to take into account
the finding that mere repetition of the subject noun in a sentence
reduced RT. (Collins and Quillian, 1970b, do not report what kind of
adjustment was made in the data. ) The results generally provided
weak support for the model of semantic memory as being hierarchically
organized with nonredundant coding of information.
Collins and Quillian (1969, 1972a) reported a number of experi-
ments aimed at determining the strategies £s use to decide that a
sentence is false. They argued that Ss can employ one of two general
strategies. They can search semantic memory for confirming evidence
for a given amount of time, or through a given number of levels, and
respond "false" if they find no confirming evidence. The other type
of strategy is to search semantic memory for contradictory evidence,
and then respond "false" when they find it.
Several lines of evidence led to the rejection of the first kind
(5f strategy. Ss do not seem to set a time limit on how long they
search (Collins and Quillian, 1972a). If there were a time limit, then
there would have been less variability in RT to false sentences than
to true sentences. The reverse was found.
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Neither do Ss set a limit on the number of levels they search
in the hierarchy. The evidence against a depth limit hypothesis was
introspective. Ss could give an interpretation to the false sentences
and could also explain why they are false (Collins and Quillian, 1972a).
If they can give an interpretation, this means that they have found
some path connecting the subject and predicate terms in the sentence.
If they can explain why they give a "false" response, this means they
have found contradictory evidence, rather than failed to find any con-
firming evidence.
Rejection of the time limit and depth limit hypotheses led to
a series of experiments testing the contradictory evidence hypothesis.
The contradiction hypothesis states that Ss respond "false" because
they have found information in memory which contradicts the informa-
tion in the sentence presented.
The Collins and Quillian (1969) paper previously discussed
included a test of the contradictory evidence hypothesis. False
sentences were constructed so that the contradictory information was
located at various levels of the hierarchy. RT to the false sentences
should, therefore, have increased as the semantic distance of the
contradictory information increased. This was not found. RT to
false property sentences showed no change with hierarchical level.
RT to false superset sentences showed a slight but not significant
decrease with hierarchical level.
These results were inconsistent with a hierarchical theory of
memory in which lower levels are searched for contradictory information
before moving up to the higher levels to search for contradictory
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information. The results of two other experiments indicated, however,
that Ss do search for contradictions, and indicated why Collins and
Quillian (1969) found that semantic distance decreased RT for false
superset sentences.
In one experiment, (Collins and Quillian, 1972a) false property
sentences were constructed with respect to two variables: (l) sentence
anomalousness, and (2) presence of extraneous paths. A sentence is
anomalous if contradictory evidence cannot be found within three
levels of the hierarchy. Non-anomalous sentences have a connecting
path within three levels of the hierarchy. Anomalousness, then, refers
to semantic distance. The greater the semantic distance, the more
anomalous the sentence. If a sentence has an extraneous path, it
means that a path can be found between the subject and predicate
terms, but the path is misleading, as in the sentences: "An almond
has a fortune," and "A newspaper is red."
For these false sentences, anomalousness had no effect on RT,
but the presence of an extraneous path significantly increased RT.
That is, semantic distance did not increase RT, but the presence of
misleading or confusing information did.
Collins and Quillian ( 1972a) stated that Ss always find at
least one path, and possibly several paths, connecting the elements
of the sentence. The Ss then compare the relationships found in
memory, to the relationship posited in the sentence. If only one
path is found, and that path contradicts the relationship stated in
the sentence, then Ss respond "false." The presence of extraneous
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patiis slows down the decision making process because Ss have to check
out several paths.
This checking of extraneous paths, Collins and Quillian
(1972a) stated, is the reason for the peculiar semantic distance effects
caBtained in Collins and Quillian (1969) for false sentences. In that
study, it took somewhat longer to respond "false" to "A canary is an
ostrich" than to "A canary is a fish." They attributed this effect to
•the presence of more extraneous paths between "canary" and "ostrich,"
than between "canary" and "fish." The time to reject false sentences
depends not on semantic distance, but "on whether or not there is a
neighboring node, which is confusable with the node given in the sentence.
Where there is such a node, [they] predicted that RT would be longer,
because the path through that node would need to be checked and rejected
[Collins and Quillian, 1972a, p. 25l."
To test the effect of confusable nodes, confusable and nonconfus-
able false property and superset sentences were constructed. A confusable
property sentence is one "where there exists within the superset a
neighboring node which has the property specified in the sentence, (e.g.,
'A tiger has a mane') [Collins and Quillian, 1972a, p. 25l." A confusable
superset sentence is one "where the superset in the sentence is highly
eonfusable with the correct superset, (e.g., 'A St. Bernard is a cat')
rCoIlins and Quillian, 1972a, p. 26l." Confusable nodes, as Collins and
Quillian define them, seem to be special cases of the occurrence of
extraneous paths. That is, for confusable sentences, the extraneous paths
occur between neighboring nodes.
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The results of this study (Collins and Quillian, 1972a) were that
the time to respond "false" to confusable property and superset sentences
was longer than the time to respond "false" to nonconfusable sentences.
Collins and Quillian ( 1972a) concluded that the "RT to decide whether a
sentence is true or false depends on the number of paths considered, and
the length of these paths. The consideration of more than one path ex-
plains why false sentences which contain misleading associations
or confusions
. . .
take longer to reject than sentences without such
associations or confusions [pp. 27-28]."
Kintsch, Crothers and Herman (1970) reported three sentence
comprehension experiments similar to those of Collins and Quillian (1969).
Kintsch, et al. presented simple sentences which differed in (l) accept-
ability, (2) semantic distance, and (3) syntax.
Acceptability refers to whether the sentences are potentially true
or false. Semantic distance refers to the degree of relationship between
the subject and predicate terms. The two variables taken together give
four kinds of sentences, (l) An acceptable sentence in which the subject
and predicate terras are closely related is a definitional sentence,
e.g., "A shark swims." (2) An acceptable sentence in which the subject
and predicate terms are not closely related is a contingently true sentence,
e.g., "A shark escapes." (3) Contradictoiy sentences are unacceptable,
and the subject and predicate terms are closely related, e.g., "A shark
growls." (a) Nonsensical sentences are unacceptable, and the subject and
predicate terms are not closely related, e.g., "A shark ticks."
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In addition to these four kinds of sentences, Kintsch, et al. (1970)
used three syntactic forms similar to those used by Collins and Quillian
(1969). They used both superset and property relation sentences. Super-
set sentences were of the form "A (noun) is a (noun)." Property relation
sentences were of one of two forms: "A (noun) is (adjective)," and "A
(no\m) (verb)."
Kintsch, et al. (1970) reported that acceptable sentences had
significantly faster RTs than unacceptable sentences. Acceptability and
semantic distance interacted. Acceptable sentences had faster RTs when
subject and predicate were closely related. Unacceptable sentences had
faster RTs when subject and predicate were not closely related. This
interaction is in agreement with Collins and Quillian' s ( 1972a) findings,
and with the results reported by other investigators (Meyer, 1970;
Schaeffer and Wallace, 1970).
Kintsch, et al. (1970) reported that syntactic form did not signifi-
cantly affect RT, nor did it interact with any other variables. Thus,
they failed to replicate Collins and Quillian 's (1969) finding that
superset sentences were easier than property sentences. Kintsch, et al.
concluded that this kind of syntactic variable is not very relevant in
sentence RT studies. They attributed Collins and Quillian 's syntactic
form effect to poor control over stimuli. Kintsch, et al. controlled the
Thomdike-Lorge frequency of the subject nouns, and of the predicate
adjectives, verbs, and nouns. Furthermore, the same subject noun was
used with twelve different predicates. Collins and Quillian (1969) re-
ported that the predicate nouns in their superset sentences tended to
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have higher Thomdike-Lorge frequencies than the adjectives and verbs in
the property sentences. Therefore, the RT difference between superset
and property sentences obtained by Collins and Quilllan may have been due
to an individual word frequency effect.
Although Kintsch, et al. (1970) failed to find a RT difference
between property and superset sentences, this may have been due to another
factor besides word frequency. Kintsch, et al. did not classify their
sentences ?n.th respect to hierarchical level. Although their semantic
distance variable is somewhat similar to Collins and Quillian's (1969)
hierarchical level variable, as can be seen from the examples presented
above, the two variables are not quite the same. The specific superset
and property terms which Kintsch, et al. used may be from different levels
of the hierarchy. Combining RTs from sentences without regard to
hierarchical level may also have contributed to the absence of a RT
difference between property and superset sentences.
Criticisms of the Collins and QuiHian Model and Alternative Models
The Collins and Quillian model and the supporting research have
been criticized by several investigators. Some of these investigators
have proposed alternative models in explanation of the data. Landauer
and Freedman (1968) have proposed a category size explanation of the data.
Schaeffer and Wallace (1969, 1970) have proposed a word comparison model.
Meyer (1970) has proposed a two-stage model of sentence comprehension.
Finally, a host of criticisms all concerned with frequency effects have
been made about their research.
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Category size argiMents
.
A study by Landauer and Freedman (1968,
Exp. 1) provided an alternative explanation of some of the Collins and
Quillian (1969) results. According to Landauer and Freedman, the RT
differences which Collins and Quillian attributed to the hierarchical
structure of memory, can be interpreted as effects of category siae.
Landauer and Freedman (1968, Exp. l) were concerned with the problem
of long-term-memory search strategies. If memory search is a serial
process, then the longer the list of items, the longer the search time
to find a particular item in memory. List length was varied by using the
following hierarchical set of categories: "word," "noun," "living thing,"
"animal," and "dog." They argued that when an item is presented, Ss must
search through a list of items stored in memory under a category name in
order to determine if that item is an instance of the category. Further-
more, they argued that in searching memory, the higher order categories
must include all the items of the lower order categories. Therefore,
search time for higher order categories should be longer than search time
for lower order categories.
(The use of "word" and "noun" as categories on a continum with
"living thing," "animal," and "dog," is illustrative of the problem
mentioned previously of what is being modeled. Landauer and Freedman,
1968, seem to imply that the model is of the Ss' knowledge of words.)
The five categories were grouped into sets of two by pairing
adjacent categories. Thus for each set of categories there was a larger
and a smaller category. Ss were told a category name, and were then
given a positive or negative instance and required to make a classification
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response. Each instance was classified twice by each S. The instance
was presented once after the larger, and once after the smaller category.
All positive instances were members of both categories, and the negative
instances were members of neither category.
Landauer and Freedman (1968, Exp. l) found that it took longer to
classify the instance with respect to the larger category. This effect
was significant for negative instances only. For positive Instances,
the difference was not significant, but in the predicted direction. This
effect held for all of the nested category comparisons, except for the
"word-noun" comparison where the RT was greater to the smaller category
"noun" than to the larger category "word." Landauer and Freedman (1968)
concluded that in making a classification response, Ss search lists of
positive instances stored in memory to determine if the presented instance
is a positive instance of a category.
The category size hypothesis provides an alternative explanation
of the Collins and Quillian (1969) finding that RT increased with
hierarchical level for superset sentences. That is, the reason that it
took longer to decide that "A canary is a bird" than to decide that "A
canary is an animal," is because the animal list in memory is longer than
the bird list in memory.
Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, 1972a) have noted this alternative
explanation of their results, and have argued that their own hierarchical
model provides a better account of the data. Their interpretation of the
Landauer and Freedman (1968, Exp. l) data is that when a positive instance
like "collie" is presented with the categories "animal" and "living
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thing," Ss have to find a path between the instance and the category in
the hierarchical memory network previously described. Classifying
"collie" as an "animal" takes less time than classifying "collie" as a
"living thing" because the first two items are closer in the semantic
hierarchy. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) attributed the failure of
Landauer and Freedman to find a significant effect for positive instances,
to the fact that Ss were continuously using the same categories. In
Collins and Quillian ( 1970b) they showed that with repetition some paths
become more accessible, thereby decreasing RT.
With negative instances, however, Ss cannot always use their
previous responses to make inferences. The results of a previous decision
can only be used if the S_ first saw the negative instance with the higher
order category, e.g., if "tulip" was a negative instance first presented
for classification with respect to the category "animal." When "tulip"
is next presented with the lov;er order category "dog," £s can use their
last response as the basis for making their response. That is, they can
decide that a tulip is not a dog, because they had previously decided that
a tulip is not an animal, and, therefore, it cannot be a dog. Responding
on the basis of this inference saves time, and thereby decreases RT for
the smaller categories.
With the positive instances, then, Ss can always make use of their
previous decisions to save time. With the negative instances, however,
the inferential step can be used to save time only when the instance first
occurs with the higher order category. This would explain the finding
that there was a significant effect for negative instances only.
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Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) stated that "for negative instances
it might be that the Ss who had animal first and dog second would be
faster on dog because they drew the correct logical conclusion, whereas
the Ss who had dog first and animal second would not be faster on animal.
This asymmetry in logic, then, might have produced the shorter times for
the smaller nested category in deciding negative instances [p. 1+33]."
rt was not clear from the Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) paper why
they argued that RT to negative instances involves using a semantic
hierarchy to make inferential decisions. In their previously discussed
paper, (Collins and Quillian, 1972a) semantic relatedness, rather than
hierarchical structure was the important determinant of RT to false
sentences, or to negative instances if a word classification task is
involved
.
To test their explanation of Landauer and Freedman's (1968, Exp. l)
results, Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) ran two experiments. The purpose
of experiment one was to determine whether category size, per se, affected
classification time. To extricate the effects of category size from
hierarchical ordering of categories, Collins and Quillian used three
categories, two of which were independent of each other, but which were
both nested within a third category. "Bird" and "dog" were selected as
the two independent categories, where "dog" was considered to be the
analler category, because there were fewer dogs than birds listed in a
thesaurus. "Anijnal" was used as the largest category. Lists of both
positive and negative instances from these categories were presented
once to Ss for "yes-no" classification. That is, S was given a category
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name, then was shown a list of positive and negative instances, one at
a time, for classification.
Landauer and Freedman's (1968) category size hypothesis predicts
that classification time for positive and negative instances increases
from "dog" to 'TDird" to "animal" since category size is increasing.
Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. l) predicted no difference in classi-
fication time across the three categories, since each positive instance
is one step removed from its category name or superset. Their predictions
for negative instances were not specified.
While Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. l) concluded that "category
size, in itself, is not a very critical variable in categorization time
[p. 43'4]/' the results were ambiguous. For negative instances, there
were no significant differences in RT across the three categories, which
argues against Landauer and Freedman's (1968) hypothesis. However, for
positive instances, the RT for the dog category was significantly less
than the RT for the bird and animal categories, a finding which supports
the category size hypothesis. The absence of a significant difference in
RT between "bird" and "animal," on the other hand, supports the Collins
and Quillian model. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. l) argued that the
higher RT for the bird and animal categories was due to Ss' forming in-
appropriate subclasses for these items, and subsequently being surprised
at the range of the positive instances presented.
A second experiment by Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. 2), a
partial replication of Landauer and Freedman's (1968, Exp.l) procedure.
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vas done to test Collins and Quillian's hypothesis about the effects of
repeated classification of the same instance.
Ss were given positive and negative instances of dogs, birds, and
animals which they were to classify with respect to the following pairs
of categories: dogs vs. animals, birds vs. animals, animals vs. living
things. Each instance was classified twice, once with respect to the
lower order category, and once with respect to the h3.gher order categoiy.
The Landauer and Freedman (1968) category size hypothesis predicts an in-
crease in classification time across the dog to bird to animal categories
for positive and negative instances. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. 2)
predicted an increase in classification time only between category pair
members.
For positive instances, there was generally a significant increase
in classification time between lower and higher order categories. There
were no significant decreases in classification time as category size
decreased, except for the dog category, which was faster than the others.
The results obtained for negative instances tended to support neither
the Landauer and Freedman (1968) category size hypothesis nor the Collins
and Quillian (1970a) hypothesis that the Ss remember their first classi-
fication response and use it in deciding on their second classification of
the same instance. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. 2) found that classi-
fication time for negative instances depends on the degree of semantic
relatedness between the instances and the category. The greater the degree
of semantic relatedness between the items, the longer the classification
time is. Specifically, they argued that a negative instance takes longer
to reject when its superset is somehow related to the category name which
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was presented. For example, it is difficult to reject the negative
instance "tree" with respect to the category "animal," because the super-
set of "tree," "plant," is semantically related to "animal."
This is similar to the finding previously reported in discussing
ixQW false sentences are rejected, (Collins and Quillian, 1972a). False
sentences, or negative instances, are difficult to reject when there are
confusable nodes involved. In this particular experiment (Collins and
Quillian, 1970a, Exp. 2), "plants" and "animals" are confusable nodes.
It is difficult to decide that "tree" is not an "animal," because a tree
is a plant, and "plant" and "animal" are confusable, or semantically
related.
Surprisingly, this interpretation was supported by the results of
a similar study by Wilkins (1971, Exp. 2). Wilkins used the same classi-
fication procedure whereby a category name was presented, followed by a
positive or negative instance, and Ss were timed on their classification
responses. Wilkins used two types of negative instances. In one case,
the negative instance was related to a superset of the category which was
presented to Ss. In the other case, there was no such relationship.
Classification of the negative instances took longer when there was a
semantic relationship between the negative instance and a superset of the
presented category.
With respect to the category size variable, however, Collins and
Quillian ( 1970a) concluded that it is the hierarchical organization of the
categories which determines classification time, rather than the number of
instances in a category.
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Probably one of the important considerations on the question of
whether category size or hierarchical structure detemines classification
time, is the method used to determine category size, Landauer and
Freedman (1968) used nested categories to increase category size. This
procedure, as Collins and Quillian (l970a) have pointed out, confounds
category size with hierarchical organization. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a)
in trying to extricate these variables, used a dictionary and a thesaurus
as external indices of category size. That is, since a dictionary lists
more types of birds than dogs, "bird" was considered the larger category.
Wilkins (1971) used a "production method" to estimate category size
in a word classification task. The production method for estimating
category size is similar to a word association procedure. Ss are given a
category name and asked to produce instances of that category. Wilkins
used the Connecticut norms (described in Bousfield, Cohen, and Whitmarsh,
1958) which were generated in the following manner. Ss were given a
category name and asked to produce four instances of that category. A
large category from the norms is presumably one where Ss gave many different
instances. A small category is one in which few instances were given.
The word classification procedure involved presentation of the
category name, then the presentation of a positive or negative instance
from a large or small category. Wilkins (1971, Exp. l) reported that
instances of large categories had significantly greater classification
times than did instances from small categories, and that negative instances
took significantly longer than did positive instances.
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Since Wilkins (1971, Exp.l) did not confound category size and
hierarchical structure, these results seemed to provide evidence for the
hypothesis that classification time depends on the number of instances
in a category. However, Wilkins' method of estimating category size makes
his conclusion questionable.
Category size, as stated, was defined by the number of different
instances listed in the Connecticut norms. However, the Connecticut norms
were generated by a technique which would seem to place a limit on the
total number of positive instances Ss produce. Limiting the number of
positive instances produced, would invalidate the use of the norms as a
way of estimating category size.
For example, Wilkins (1971, Exp. l) used "vegetable" as a small
category, as defined by the Connecticut norms. In collecting these norms,
Ss were told to list only four instances of "vegetable." Given a limit on
the number of instances to write, Ss probably list only the most common
vegetables, rather than try to think of unusual instances. If all Ss list
only the four most common vegetables, then one would conclude that
"vegetable" is a small category.
In summary, it seems that the Landauer and Freedman (1968) argument
that category size affects the time to search semantic memory has not been
demonstrated because of methodological problems in isolating category size
frcan hierarchical organization, and in adequately estimating category size.
Recently, Landauer and Meyer (1972) have reviewed the category-size
literature, presented some additional relevant data, and proposed a category-
search model to account for the results of word classification studies.
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In their review of the literature, Landauer and Meyer (1972)
criticized the Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) study for the use of a small
munber of categories, and they criticized the Wilkins (1971) study for
the specific instances Wilkins used. Landauer and Meyer argued that the
Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) semantic relatedness hypothesis has not been
adequately tested. Landauer and Meyer (1972) also pointed out that the
Collins and Quillian ( 1970a, Exp. l) failure to find a category size effect
for positive instances may have been due to Ss' redefining the categories
E presented. Collins and Quillian (l970a, Exp. l) considered "animals"
a large category. However, their Ss might have considered "animals" to
mean "mammals," thereby reducing category size and narrowing the category
size difference between "animals," "dogs," and "birds."
Landauer and Meyer (1972) then presented data from two experiments
which demonstrated category size effects. Meyer and Ellis (1970) had Ss
classify positive and negative instances with respect to nested categories.
Meyer and Ellis included a condition where nonwords, e.g., "mafer," were
presented as negative instances of the nested categories. Meyer and Ellis
found a category size effect for the positive and negative instances, and
also for the nonwords.
Landauer and Meyer (1972) stated that the category size effect for
nonwords is evidence against Collins and Quillian 's ( 1970a) semantic
relatedness hypothesis for negative instances. However, as Landauer and
Meyer (1972) pointed out, it does not seem reasonable to generalize about
thie- treatment of negative instances on the basis of nonword data.
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As a more appropriate test of the category size and semantic
relatedness hypothesis ahout negative instances, Landauer and Meyer
(1972) presented a reanalysis of some data which were collected in an
unpublished replication of the Landauer and Freedman (1968, Exp. l) study.
In this study, Ss classified positive and negative instances (words) with
respect to five pairs of nested categories. Both positive and negative
instances showed a category size effect.
As a test of the semantic relatedness hypothesis, Landauer and Meyer
(1972) had Ss rank the negative instances for "closeness in meaning" to
the nested category members. Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) predict an
interaction between semantic relatedness and category size for negative
instances. That is, when the negative instances are semantically related
to the nested categories, RT should be faster to the smaller of the nested
categories. When the negative instances are not semantically related to
the nested categories, there should be no difference, or at least a smaller
difference, in RT to the nested categories.
Landauer and Meyer (1972) reported that RT was faster for the smaller
categories than for the larger categories for both the closely related and
the more remotely related negative instances. Therefore, they concluded
that the Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) semantic relatedness hypothesis is
insufficient to explain the observed category size effects for negative
instances. Landauer and Meyer's argument is open to the criticism that
even though the Ss were able to differentiate among the negative instances
on the basis of "closeness in meaning" to the nested categories, the
entire
set of negative instances might have been semantically related to
the
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nested categories, so that the differentiation on the basis of ranking
was of minimal significance. This possibility, however, seems rather
remote
.
Landauer and Meyer (1972) then argued that a simple model of the
word classification effects assumes that S has a file of category names
with lists of instances for each category stored in memory. When an
instance is presented, S checks the relevant category list, and responds
"yes" if the instance appears on the memory list, and "no" otherwise. The
advantages of this model are that "it requires less information to be
stored in memory, and embodies fewer assumptions about memory organization
and search processes [Landauer and Meyer, 1972, p. 54^1."
This model does seem to offer as adequate an explanation of the word
classification effects as does the Collins and Quillian (1969, 1970a) model.
Landauer and Meyer's (1972) discussion of the model, however, was ambiguous
with respect to what items are included on the category lists in memory.
In a discussion of an example case of the items on a category list in
memory, they implied that only those items which are in a subset relation-
ship to the category appear on the list, e.g., only "collie," "terrier,"
and "dachshund" appear on the "dog" list (Landauer and Meyer, 1972, p.
That is, in their example case, each category list is a two-level hierarchy
.
In the appendix to the paper (Landauer and Meyer, 1972), Iiowever, they
noted tliat they are discussing "categorization tasks in which the 'category
members' denote either subset.s of the specified category or sets that
partially overlap it, whereas 'nonmembers' denote sets that are disjoint
from the category. ... In these tasks, it is sufficient to retrieve
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Iriformation about whether the test word refers to a set tliat 'intersects'
the specified category, that is, shares at least one exemplar [p. 5U8]."
This general description of how list membership is determined implies that
an item like "pets" occurs on the lists for "animals" and "dogs." This
Mnd of category list is not hierarchical.
Previous word classification studies have used positive instances
which are subsets of the nested categories. There have been no word
classification studies where the instances overlap the nested categories,
at least to the writer's knowledge, and a category size effect for this
type of situation has not been demonstrated. Therefore, there is no data
which would warrant positing the latter, less structured category lists for
memory.
The former, two-level hierarchical category lists are similar to the
hierarchies posited by Collins and Quillian (1969). The major difference
between the models then is whether the RT increase in the classification
of a positive instance with respect to nested categories derives from
checking a list of category instances, or from moving from the instance to
its higher order category.
Further evidence that category size does not affect retrieval time
from semantic memory comes from a study by Freedman and Loftus (l97l). Ss
were presented with a category and asked to produce an instance of that
category. For each category used, Ss were shown the category name plus one
of two constraints on their response. The category was shown with either a
constraining adjective, e.g., "flower-yellow," or with the first letter of
a positive instance, e.g., "flower-p."
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Category size was estimated by the use of the production method. Ss
were shown the categories, adjectives, and letters used in the study, and
were required to write down as many instances as possible in a one-minute
period. This method of estimating category size decreases the likelihood
that Ss give only the most common instances.
Freedman and Loftus (1971) reported finding a small, negative corre-
lation between category size and RT. Moreover, this correlation dropped
to near zero, when other variables were taken into account. They also
reported a faster RT for the noun-adjective pairs than for the noun-letter
pairs
.
Freedman and Loftus (l97l) argued that the absence of a category
size effect indicates that Ss do not search lists of possible instances
successively in retrieving words from memory. They felt that the data
were consistent with Quillian's (1968) model which provides for immediate
access to the category name, after which the search can spread out to
specific instances of the category.
The model which seems to account for the data is the spreading
activation model. Collins and Quillian (1969, 1970b) argued that when
the search process starts at some particular node, it continues along several
paths simultaneously. Collins and Quillian (1969) have shown that the
spreading activation model is a viable model when memory search is moving
up the hierarchy, and Freedman and Loftus (l97l) have shown that spreading
activation or parallel search is a viable description of memory search when
moving down the hierarchy.
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Schaeffer aiid Wallace's word comparison model
. Schaeffer and
Wallace (1969, 1970) have reported a series of word classification ex-
periments which they felt disconfirmed the Collins and Quillian (1969)
model, and supported their own model of a word comparison process.
In the first experiment reported in Schaeffer and Wallace (1969,
Exp. 1), Ss were shown two instances from the four categories: mammal,
flower, fabric, and metal. Their task was to respond "same" if both
instances were living things, or if both instances were nonliving things,
and to respond "different" if one instance was living and the other instance
was a nonliving thing.
Schaeffer and Wallace (1969, Exp. l) found that classification time
was faster when both instances were from the same category. For example,
classification time was faster when both instances were fabrics, than when
one instance was a fabric and one a mietal. Although they did not report
the results of a significance test, "same" Judgments were somewhat faster
than "different" judgments.
There are probably several models which can explain these results,
including the Collins and Quillian (1969) mo'del. Interpretation in terms
of the hierarchical model stresses how much of the hierarchy has to be
searched before enough information is retrieved to make a decision. With
two instances of the same category, search need proceed only one step to
their common superordinate in order for Ss to decide "same." With instances
from two categories, however, Ss have to search the hierarchy up to the
"living thing" node before a "same" decision can be made. Similarly,
"different" judgments require more time than "same" judgments, because
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more of the hierarchy has to be searched before a connection can be found
between the two instances.
Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) explained the results of this study
(1969, Exp. 1), using a word comparison model. They found that Ss could
more rapidly decide that "elephant" and "lion" were living things, than
that "elephant" and "daisy" were living things. When the items are
presented, they argued Ss retrieve a set of semantic elements which consti-
tute the meaning of these words, including the element "living." All
three words have this element in common. However, "elephant" and "lion"
also have other elements in common, e.g., "animal," and "majmal." In
Schaeffer and Wallace's (1970) terms, there is a greater degree of semantic
overlap between "lion" and "elephant." Because these concepts overlap,
the threshold for making a "same" response is reached faster, than in the
comparison of "lion" and "daisy."
One problem with this explanation is that it was not clear why the
determination that "lion" and "elephant" are both animals and mammals is
relevant to deciding that they are both living things. The experimental
task required only the decision that they both be living things. While it
is true that there is more semantic overlap between "lion" and "elephant,"
than between "lion" and "daisy," Schaeffer and Wallace (1970), by omitting
assunrptions about structural organization of memory, have not provided S_s
with a way of determining the relevance of the semantic overlap. They
seemed to be arguing that any kind of semantic overlap can influence the
decision, regardless of the relevance of the information.
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Sehaeffer and Wallace (1970, Exp. l) reported another study in which
they varied the degree of semantic similarity among items when Ss were
required to make "different" judgments. Ss were presented with two
instances selected from the four categories: tree, flower, bird, and
mammal. They were to respond "same" if the instances were from the same
category, and "different" if the instances were from different categories.
In this task, there were two kinds of "different" judgments, semantically
similar "differents,
" as in the comparison of "hemlock" and "daisy," and
semantically dissimilar "differents," as in the comparison of "hemlock"
and "parrot." (In the terminology of a hierarchical model, Sehaeffer and
Wallace, 1970, Exp. 1, varied the semantic distance between nodes when
making "false" judgments.)
Sehaeffer and Wallace's (1970) word comparison model predicts that
the greater the semantic similarity, the more difficult it is to decide
that the instances are different. Therefore, RT is longer for seman-
tically similar "different" comparisons than for semantically dissimilar
"differents." Their predictions were confirmed. That is, it took longer
to decide that "hemlock" and "daisy" were not members of the same cate-
gory, than to decide that "hemlock" and "parrot" were not members of the
same category.
Sehaeffer and Wallace's (1970) analysis of the results was as
follows. When a word is presented, all the semantic elements defining
the word are retrieved. The semantic elements in "hemlock" are com-
pared to those in "daisy," and S finds the element "tree" for the word
"hemlock," and the element "flower" for the word "daisy." Therefore, he
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has sufficient information to respond "different." However, he also
finds that the element "plant" is listed with both words. This semantic
overlap confuses the S and makes the "different" response more difficult.
Again, it is not clear why these extraneous semantic elements enter into
the decision making process to increase response time.
In a second experiment, reported in Schaeffer and Wallace (1970,
Exp. 2), it was found that the semantic similarity did not significantly
affect RT for "different" Judgments when one item was a category instance,
and the other was a category name. Judgment time for the pair "hemlock-
flower" was very slightly, but not significantly, longer than the judgment
time for "hemlocksbird." For an instance-category comparison, Schaeffer
and Wallace (1970) argued that Ss do not have to retrieve the semantic
elements of the category word. Therefore, there is no overlap between the
semantic elements of the instance and the semantic elements of the category
to confuse Ss in making a decision.
One problem with Schaeffer and Wallace's (1970) interpretation of
experiment two is that they gave no reason why in this particular task the
Ss did not retrieve the semantic elements which define the category word.
They did not explain why when "hemlock-bird, " for example, was presented,
Ss did not retrieve the elements which define "bird," but only retrieved
the elements which define "hemlock."
Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) noted this problem with their theory.
They remarked that in another of their studies (Schaeffer and Wallace,
1969, Exp. 2), when Ss were presented with category names, they apparently
retrieved the semantic elements which define the categories, even though
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it was not necessary. In Schaeffer and Wallace (1969, Exp. 2), Ss were
shovm two of the following category names together: bird, majimal, fruit,
and grain. If "bird" and "mammal," or "fruit" and "grain," were the
categories presented together, then the categories were semantically
similar. For all other combinations of these four categories, there was
semantic dissimilarity between the two categories i^resented. Following
the presentation of semantically similar or semantically dissimilar
categories, Ss were shown a positive instance of one of the two cate-
gories, for example, "narrot," and the Ss were to indicate the correct
category. Classification times were longer when the categories had been
similar then when the categories had been dissimilar. It was easier to
classify "parrot" as a bird, after having seen the categories "bird-
grain," than after having seen the categories "bird-mammal."
Now Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) could explain this result in terms
of overlap of semantic elements, but they could not explain why Ss were
retrieving semantic elements for the categories in this experiment,
(Schaeffer and Wallace, 1969, Exp. 2), when it was unnecessary to retrieve
the semantic elements in the previously reported experiment using category
names (Schaeffer and Wallace, 1970, Exp. 2).
There are two problems with their word comparison model then. First,
the model does not explain how, when there is semantic overlap, Ss are able
to eventually decide which elements are significant for a decision, because
their model does not make anv assnmptioTiR about the structure of semantic
Information. Second, the model cannot predict 'when semantic elements are
retrieved given that a word has been presented.
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Nevertheless, Schaeffer and Wallace (1970) felt that the effects
of semantic similarity on "different" judgments provided evidence against
the Collins and Quillian (1969) model. The reason for this, in the
language of the hierarchical model, is that if semantic distance increases
the time to make a "true" response, semantic distance should also increase
the time to make a "false" response. This would seem to be the most
straightforward prediction of the Collins and Quillian model. This pre-
diction has not generally heen confirmed, and, as has been previously
discussed, Collins and Quillian ( 1972a) have had to modify their model to
explain how people respond to false sentences.
Meyer ' s two-stage model of sentence verification
. Meyer ( 1970 ) , on
the basis of a study on RT to true and false sentences, presented another
model of the sentence verification process. Meyer's is a two-stage model.
Meyer (1970, Exp. l) presented universal affirmative sentences,
i.e., "All (noun) are (noun)." Meyer used four types of logical relations
between the subject and predicate noun classes: subset, superset, over-
lapping, and disjoint. In a subset relation, the subject noun class is
a subset of the predicate noun class, as in the sentence "All thrones
are furniture." These universal affirmative sentences, where subject and
predicate noun classes are in a subset relation, are analagous to Collins
and Quillian 's (1969) true superset relation sentences. In Meyer's super-
set relation sentences, the subject noun class is a superset of the
predicate noun class, as in "All stones are rubies." In the overlapping
relation, the subject and predicate nouns overlap in the set of elements
they refer to, as in "All mothers are writers." In the disjoint relation,
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the subject and predicate noun classes have no elements in common, as in
"All houses are vacuums."
As can he seen from the example, the universal affirmative sentences
fn which the subject and predicate noun classes are in a superset, over-
lapping, or disjoint relationship, are all false. It is difficult to
determine which of the Collins and Quillian (1969) false sentences these
correspond to, since Collins and Quillian defined false sentences in
terms of a hierarchical structure. However, the universal affirmatives
where subject and predicate are in a disjoint or overlapping relationship
seem to be closest to those which Collins and Quillian classified as false
superset sentences.
Besides the logical relationship between subject and predicate noun
classes, Meyer (1970) also manipulated the size of the classes denoted by
the subject and predicate nouns. This manipulation involved replacing
the noun with a higher order category. In terms of the four examples
presented, increasing subject noun class size gives the following sentences:
"All chairs are furniture;" "All females are writers;" "All solids are
rubies;" and "All structures are vacuums." Predicate noun class size was
also manipulated by replacing the predicate noun with its higher order
category.
Increasing predicate noun class size is comparable to what Collins
and Quillian (1969) referred to as increasing hierarchical level, or
semantic distance. That is, Collins and Quillian used the sentences: "A
canary is a bird," and "A canary is an animal," where "canary" is further
from "animal" than from "bird" in the semantic hierarchy. Collins and
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QuiHian manipulated only the predicate noun class size, rather than the
size of both subject and predicate noun classes.
Meyer (1970) found that RT varied with the type of logical relation-
ship. The order of RT from fastest to slowest was: disjoint, subset,
overlap, and superset.
Increasing subject noun class size (decreasing semantic distance):
(l) significantly decreased RT for subset and overlapping relation
sentences; (2) significantly increased RT for superset relation sentences;
and (3) had no effect on disjoint relation sentences. The decrease in RT
for subset sentences is in agreement with Collins and Quillian's (1969)
iQodel. Increasing subject noun class size means that the distance between
the two nodes in the hierarchy has been decreased. Collins and Quillian
predict that for true sentences decreasing semantic distance decreases RT.
Increasing predicate noun class size (increasing semantic distance):
(l) significantly increased RT for subset, superset and disjoint relation
sentences; and (2) increased, but not significantly, RT for overlapping
relation sentences. Again, the effect of increasing predicate noun class
size for subset relation sentences was as predicted by the Collins and
Quillian (1969) model.
The Collins and Quillian (1969, 1972a) model makes no clear-cut
predictions with respect to the false sentences used by Meyer (1970).
Falsity, according to Collins and Quillian, is determined by finding
contradictions between the sentence and information in the semantic
hierarchy. Searching for and finding contradictions depends on the par-
ticular semantic information presented, and is not simply related to the
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type of logical relationship between subject and predicate nouns, or to
the semantic distance between subject and predicate nouns.
On the basis of these results, and Ss' introspections, Meyer (1970)
presented a two-stage model of the processes involved in sentence veri-
fication. Ss reported that they first tried to decide if the two words
were at all related. Meyer stated that this is the first stage of sentence
verification, attempting to find a relation between the subject and predi-
cate nouns. If they are not related, as in the disjoint relation sentences,
Ss respond "false." If they are related in some way, Ss must then decide
during stage two if the subject noun is a subset of the predicate noun
class. If so, he responds "true." If not, he responds "false" to the
overlapping and superset relation sentences. During stage one, then, Ss
discriminate between disjoint relations and the other three, and during
stage two, S_s discriminate between subset relations and the other two.
Meyer (1970) tested this two-stage model by using a task that would
theoretically eliminate stage two, thereby decreasing RT. The verification
of particiilar affirmative sentences, i.e., "Some (noun) are (noun)," is
such a task. When the sentences are particular affirmatives, Ss have only
to decide if the subject and predicate nouns are related. If they have any
elements in common, that is, if they intersect, Ss can respond "true."
If they do not have any elements in common, as in the case of disjoint
relations,. Ss can respond "false." For the particular affirmative sen-
tences, only differentiation between disjoint relation sentences and the
other three is necessary for correct responding. Stage two should be
eliminated.
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If the two-stage model is correct, Meyer (l970) predicted the
following effects, (l) For disjoint relation sentences, RT to particular
and universal affirmatives should be the same. This follov/s from the idea
that stage one only is required for differentiating between the disjoint
sentences and the other three. (2) For the subset, superset, and overlap-
ping sentences, RT to particular affirmatives should be less than the RT
to universal affirmatives. Again, the reason for this prediction is that
stage two is eliminated for particular affirmatives, but not for universal
affirmatives. Eliminating stage two, should decrease RT. (3) For disjoint
relation sentences, changes in subject and predicate noun class size will
affect RT to particular affirmatives in the same way as they were found to
affect RT to universal affirmatives.
Consequently, Meyer (1970) presented Ss with particular affirmative
sentences, for "true-false" judgments. Type of logical relation, as well
as subject and predicate noun class size were varied.
Type of logical relation affected RT for the particular affirmatives.
The ordering of RTs from fastest to slowest was: subset, superset, over-
lapping, and disjoint.
Increasing subject noun class size: (l) significantly decreased RT
for subset relation sentences; (2) significantly increased RT for superset
and disjoint relation sentences; and (3) did not significantly change RT
for overlapping relation sentences. Increasing predicate noun class size:
(1) significantly decreased RT for superset and disjoint relation sentences;
(2) significantly increased RT for subset relation sentences; and (3) did
not significantly change RT for overlapping relation sentences.
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Predictions (l) and (2) of the two-stage model were confirmed. RT
to particular affirmatives was not significantly different from RT to
universal affirmatives for disjoint relation sentences. For the subset,
superset, and overlapping relation sentences, however, RT to particular
affirmatives was significantly less than RT to universal affirmatives.
I^diction (3) concerning the effect of changes in subject and
predicate noun class size on disjoint relations was not completely con-
firmed. Increasing predicate noun class size increased RT for both
universal and particular affirmatives. However, increasing subject noun
class size increased RT for particular affirmatives, and had no significant
effect on universal affirmatives. The two-stage model predicts that in-
creasing subject noun class size should not have affected RT to particular
affirmatives, since it did not have an effect on universal affirmatives.
Meyer (1970) attributed this non-confirmation of the model to reading
errors which S_s could have made on the particular affirmatives. He said
that in reading particular affirmatives, Ss may have interchanged or con-
fused the subject and predicate nouns. For example, they might liave read
"Some vacuums are houses," instead of "Some houses are vacuums." This
type of error would not change the truth value of particular affirmatives,
as it would have for universal affirmatives, and in reading the universal
affirmatives, perhaps Ss were more careful not to malce this kind of inter-
change. If, however, they did make the interchange, then when the E
increased subject noun class size, S changed it into an increase in
predicate noun class size. Since increasing predicate noun class size in-
creased RT for universal affirmatives, then it is not surprising that the
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S-defined increase in predicate noun class size increased RT for
particular affirmatives.
Meyer (1970) concluded that the two-stage model was supported by
the results of experiment two. Furthermore, he used the category size
effects to determine what kind of retrieval processes are involved in
each stage, and what kind of information is stored in memory.
Stage one, it will be recalled, involves determining whether the
elements in the subject and predicate noun categories intersect. This
stage, according to Meyer (1970), requires that S retrieve the names of
categories which intersect with the predicate noun category. S then
compares these categories to the subject noun. If one of the predicate
intersections matches the subject noun, S responds "true," or if \ini-
versal affirmatives are presented, S goes on to stage two. Stage one is
referred to as the predicate-intersections stage.
Meyer (1970) further speculated about the organization of the
predicate-intersections file which S consults. Figure 4- (from Meyer,
1970) shows the quasi-hierarchical structure he postulated. If the
Insert Figure 4- about here
predicate noun is "stone," S retrieves the following kinds of items. S
retrieves items which are supersets of the predicate noun, like "solid."
S retrieves subsets of "stone," like "gem." S retrieves items like "gift"
wblQh overlap with "stone." Items closest to "stone," like "solid" and
"gem," are retrieved first for comparison to the subject noun.
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Meyer (1970) stated that this structure is very similar to the one
postulated by Collins and Quillian (1969). However, the structure differs
from the Collins and Quillian model in that "if they exist, these pointers
[to categories which intersect the predicate noun] probably differ in an
important way from those Collins and Quillian
. . . propose: they
apparently caimot be used for searching either the names of P- [predicate]
supersets alone or those of P-subsets .... In fact, these pointers may
convey no precise information about set relations [Meyer, 1970, p. 274]."
Thus, Ss do consult a quasi-hierarchical structure, but they use the
structure only to determine whether there is a relationship between the
two categories, but not the type of relationship between the two categories,
Determination of the type of relationship involves other processes which
occur during stage two.
This description of how the predicate-intersections file is used
raises a problem for the processing of disjoint relation sentences.
Presumably, Ss consult the intersections file to determine that certain
categories, e.g., "typhoons" and "grains" are disjoint. In Meyer's (1970)
terms, this would mean there is no path relating these two words in the
intersections file. Using V/ebster ' s New World Dictionary (The World
Publishing Co., I960), the writer found the following relationship between
"typhoon" and "grain" : typhoon—wind—air
—
gas—substance—matter
—
particle—seed
—
grain. This relationship, while it is long, and while it
probably uses superset, subset, and overlapping relations, is nevertheless
a relationship, or path between the two words. If S retrieved this rela-
tionship during stage one, he would respond erroneously. In short, the
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predicate-intersections file concept does not provide S with sufficient
information to decide that "typhoon" is not "grain."
Meyer (1970) also tested a number of models describing stage two,
wherein subset relation sentences are differentiated from the superset
and overlapping relation sentences. Three potential models were tested:
the exemplar model, the attribute model, and the exemplar-attribute model.
In the exemplar model, S retrieves examples of the subject and
predicate noun categories, and responds "true" if each subject exemplar
is also a predicate exemplar.
In the attribute model, S retrieves defining attributes of the
subject and predicate noun categories, and responds "true" if each predi-
cate noun attribute is also an attribute of the subject noun.
In the exemplar-attribute model, both exemplars and attributes are
available for retrieval. S responds "true" if the attributes of all
subject exemplars match the attributes of the predicate noun.
The models were tested by deriving their predictions for the effects
of category size on stage two duration. Stage two duration was estimated
by the subtraction method. That is, the RT to universal affirmatives
where the subject and predicate are in a subset, superset, or overlapping
relationship can be broken down into three components : ( 1 ) the time to
complete stage one; (2) the time to complete stage two; and (3) the time
duration of any additional processes required by the task, like sentence
encoding
.
The RT to particular affirmatives where the subject and predicate
are in a subset, superset, or overlapping relationship can be broken down
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into only two components: (l) the time to complete stage one; and
(2) the time duration of any additional processes required hy the task.
That is, for particular affirmatives, stage two is omitted. Therefore,
stage two duration can be estimated by subtracting the mean RT to particu-
lar affirmatives from the mean RT to universal affirmatives when the sub-
ject and predicate noun classes are in a subset, superset, or overlapping
relationship.
It was found that the attribute model made the most accurate pre-
dictions. The model predicts that increasing subject noun class size does
not change the duration of stage two for subset relation sentences. The
attribute model makes no predictions for superset and overlapping relations.
The attribute model also predicts that increasing predicate noun class
size decreases stage two duration for subset relation sentences. Both of
these predictions were confirmed.
Meyer's (1970) results provided confirming evidence for the Collins
and Quillian (1969) model for those cases where the Collins and Quillian
model makes clear-cut predictions. That is, for true universal affirmative
sentences the effects of increasing subject and predicate noun class size
were as predicted by the Collins and Quillian model. Increasing subject
noun class size decreased semantic distance and, therefore, should have
decreased RT. Increasing predicate noun class size increased semantic
distance and, therefore, should have increased RT. Both effects were
obtained.
It is not possible to make predictions about the false sentences
Meyer (1970) studied, using the Collins and Quillian (1969) model, for
reasons previously stated.
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With particular affirmatives there is a change in the syntax of
the sentence, and Collins and Quillian have nof discussed the effects
of this type of change. However, it should he noted that for particular
affirmative sentences, where subject and predicate are in a subset
relation, the results Meyer (1970) obtained for changes in subject and
predicate noun class size were the same as those he obtained for universal
affirmatives. Increasing subject noun class size decreased RT, and in-
creasing predicate noun class size increased RT. These results are con-
sistent v/ith the Collins and Quillian (1969) model.
Collins and Quillian (1972) have commented that Meyer's (1970) model
is similar to theirs. They stated that "comparing concepts involves a
semantic search outward in parallel from both the concepts to all associated
properties, including superset properties [Collins and Quillian, 1972,
p. 330] ." This search seems roughly analogous to stage one of Meyer's
model. Then "any connection found must be checked to see if the relation
between the concepts meets the constraints of syntax and context (includ-
ing the instructions) [Collins and Quillian, 1972, p. 330]." This mdght
correspond to stage two in Meyer ' s model
.
In fact, Collins and Quillian (1972), stated "we doubt that our
differences with his model are veiy substantive except in one respect. He
considers several decision strategies .... But he treats decision
strategies as if people use one of the strategies consistently, at least
in any one task, whereas we are arguing that the decision strategy will
depend on the connections found. Our position weakens the kind of ex-
perimental predictions that can be made, but we think it is unavoidable
[p. 33k]."
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Frequency freaks. A possible source of confounding in this type
of research has to do with word frequency effects. Three potential
word frequency effects have been considered as contributing to the ob-
tained. RT differences.
Howes (see Miller, 1951) reported that high frequency words can
be recognized more quickly than low frequency words. Individual word
frequencies may, therefore, have contributed to RT differences obtained
in the sentence studies, or to the RT differences obtained in the word
classification studies. The argument would be that a sentence like "A
canaiy is a bird" is easier than a sentence like "An ostrich is an
animal," because "canary" has a higher frequency than "ostrich." This
particular type of frequency effect has been controlled for, or found not
to have contributed much to RT differences.
In their first study on the hierarchical organization of memory,
Collins and Quillian (1969) did not control individual word frequencies.
However, they subsequently computed a weighted average of the individual
word frequencies for each sentence, using Thorndike and Lorge (1944)
word tables. They reported that the predicate nouns in the superset sen-
tences tended to have high Thorndike-Lorge frequencies. This difference
in word frequency could have affected the finding that superset sentences
had. lower RTs than property sentences. This argument is supported by the
results of Kintsch, et al. (1970). Kintsch, et al. controlled word
frequency and found no RT difference between superset and property sen-
tences.
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Meyer (1970) reported that "an attempt was made ... to equate
tlie lengths and frequencies (Thorndike and Lorge, 194^) of: (l) S-category
names within pairs where S-size was varied, (2) P-category names within
pairs where P-size was varied, and (3) both S- and P-category names between
pairs involving different set relations [p. 26l]."
Landauer and Freedman (1968) and Schaeffer and Wallace (1969, 1970)
did not report controlling word frequencies in their word classification
studies. However, Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) partially replicated the
Landauer and Freedman study and did control word frequency. In constructing
lists of positive and negative instances of the categories "dog," "bird,"
and "animal," Collins and Quillian ( 1970a) matched word frequencies among
the three lists of positive instances, and between lists of positive and
negative instances.
Since semantic distance has been shown to affect RT in studies
where word frequency has been controlled, (e.g., Meyer, 1970), it is con-
cluded that word frequency, per se, is not the determining variable.
However, word frequency may have been the basis of the RT difference
between property and superset sentences.
Wilkins ( 1971 ) argued that in sentence classification and word
classification studies, controlling individual word frequencies is an
inadequate procedure. A potentially more important frequency effect,
WilMns stated, is conjoint frequency. The "frequency of co-occurrence
of category and instance in English usage is a critical variable. This
conjoint frequency can, of course, be independent of the individual
frequencies of the category and instance [Wilkins, 1971, p. 3^2]."
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Wilkins (l97l) suggested that conjoint frequency may be estimated
by using the Connecticut word association noms. These norms were
developed by presenting Ss with a category, and having Ss produce instances
of that category.
Conjoint frequency provides an alternative explanation to semantic
distance in accounting for RT effects. According to a conjoint frequency
explanation, the sentence "A canary is a bird" has a faster RT than "A
canary is an animal/' because "canary" has a higher frequency of co-
occurrence with "bird" than with "animal."
WilMns (1971, Exp. l) tested this hypothesis in a word classification
task. Ss were shown a category name, then a positive or negative instance,
and were required to make a "yes-no" classification response. The
Connecticut word norms were used as an index of conjoint frequency. Posi-
tive instances of a category were selected, and these instances had either
a high or low frequency of co-occurrence with the category word. The
Thorndike-Lorge frequency of the individual words was held constant.
Wilkins found that instances with a high conjoint frequency of occurrence
had faster classification response times than instances with a low conjoint
frequency of occurrence.
In a second experiment, Wilkins (1971, Exp. 2) varied the frequency
of occurrence, using Thorndike-Lorge tables, while keeping conjoint fre-
quency constant. There was no significant difference in classification
times for the more frequent versus the less frequent words.
Wilkins' (l97l) results indicated that conjoint frequency of category
and instance, and hierarchical organization of words in memory, are
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potential explanations of the observed increase in RT between sentences
lite "A canary is a bird" and "A canary is an animal." His results also
supported the previously stated conclusion that individual word frequency
is not an important determinant of RT for superset sentences.
The conjoint frequency of categories argument is relevant to
sentences Collins and Quillian (1969) classified as superset sentences.
An analogous argument has been made with respect to Collins and Quillian'
s
property sentences, e.g., "A canary is yellow," and "A canary has wings."
One could argue that for the category "canary, " the properties "is yellow"
and "has wings" are both directly associated with "canaiy, " but the two
properties differ in their frequency of co-occurrence. Property frequency,
rather than semantic distance might be the basis of RT difference between
the sentences. Conrad (1972) has presented this argument as an alternative
hypothesis to Collins and Quillian 's (1969) hypothesis of nonredundant
storage, or cognitive economy.
Conrad's (1972) criticism of the cognitive economy concept was a
frequency argument. She had Ss write descriptions of categories like
"canary," "bird," and "animal." The frequency of occurrence of each
property was then rated as high, moderate or low, depending on how many
Ss stated a particular property. Her Ss were describing many of the same
words used by Collins and Quillian (1969). Conrad then classified Collins
and Quillian' s level 0, level 1, and level 2 property sentences with
respect to how frequently these properties were produced in her Ss'
descriptions of a category. Conrad reported that the properties Collins
and Quillian classified as level 0 were most frequent in Ss' descriptions.
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Those properties classified as level 1 properties were less frequently
produced,, and those classified as level 2 properties were least frequently
produced. According to Conrad's analysis, the difference between level 0,
1, and 2 properties, is not where they are stored in the hierarchy, but
how difficult these properties are to retrieve with respect to a given
category. Presumably, retrieval difficulty depends on how frequently
these properties have occurred with a particular category in Ss' experience.
To test this idea, Conrad (1972, Exp. l) used Ss' descriptions of
categories from three levels of a hierarchy, e.g., "canary," "bird," and
"animal." For each level, properties were grouped with respect to fre-
quency of occurrence. True property sentences were then constructed using
only level 0 categories, e.g., "canary," paired with high, moderate, and
low frequency properties from each level of the hierarchy.
Conrad (1972) found that property frequency had a significant effect
on RT. RT increased as property frequency decreased. There was no main
effect for hierarchical level, however. This absence of a main effect for
level is not unexpected. The significance test reported included true
and false sentences. As previously mentioned, RT does not increase with
hierarchical level for false sentences, but only for true sentences.
Conrad confirmed this finding. She reported a significant level by truth
value interaction. For true sentences, RT increased slightly with in-
creasing hierarchical level, but for false sentences RT decreased with
increasing hierarchical level. She also reported that the increase in
RT with hierarchical level for true sentences, was strongest for moderate
and low frequency properties. For high frequency property sentences, RT
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increased from level 0 to level 1, but decreased from level 1 to level
Conrad (1972) concluded that Collins and Quillian (1969) confounded
hierarchical level and property frequency. She stated that the level 0
properties which Collins and Quillian used were high frequency properties,
that their level 1 properties were moderate frequency properties, and
their level 2 properties were low frequency properties.
Thus far, Conrad's data do not indicate that property frequency
rather than hierarchical level determines RT. The data showed that both
property frequency and hierarchical level contribute to RT for property
sentences
.
The method Conrad ( 1972 ) used to determine property frequency is
subject to criticism. It is possible that differences in property fre-
quency are dependent upon hierarchical organization of property information.
In describing the category "canary," for example, Ss might start with
properties peculiar to canaries, then some Ss might go on to list properties
of birds, and fewer Ss might go on to list properties of animals as well.
From a structural point of view, it is the frequency effects which are
explained by assuming cognitive economy, rather than cognitive economy
being explained in terms of frequency. (A similar argument may be made
for the category frequency hypothesis. Wilkins', 1971, data on frequency
of. co-occurrence of categories may be explained in terms of hierarchical
organization of categories.)
Conrad (1972) seemed to be aware of this criticism in that she
stated that the results "are subject to the criticism that the selection
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of properties to be assigned at any given level might be biased [p. 153]."
She reported a second experiment which is a more adequate test of the
property frequency versus cognitive economy hypotheses. In this study,
Conrad manipulated the level of the superordinate noun, while keeping
property level constant. For example, RTs to the following sentences
were compared: "A canary can move," "A bird can move," and "An animal can
move." This manipulation of subject noun class size is similar to Meyer's
(1970) manipulation of subject noun class size for superset sentences like
"A canary is an animal," and "A bird is an animal." According to the
Collins and Quillian (1969) model, RT should decrease as the hierarchical
level of the subject noun increases.
This prediction was not confirmed. Conrad (1972, Exp. 2) found no
consistent decrease in RT as the number of steps separating the subject
noun and property decreased. She concluded that while there is evidence
for the hierarchical organization of semantic categories, properties are
stored directly with every relevant category. In those studies where
cognitive economy of storage was found, Conrad said that the effect was
due to property frequency. This conclusion seems to contradict her own
finding that both hierarchical level and frequency affected RT in the first
experiment. Furthermore, the sentences used in this second experiment
were produced by using Ss' descriptions, and the previous criticism still
seems relevant.
An experiment reported by Collins and Quillian ( 1972a) is relevant
to the property frequency hypothesis. Collins and Quillian tested their
model in a manner similar to Conrad. Using the property sentences of
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their original study (1969), they simultaneously manipulated hierarchical
level of the subject noun and the property. That is if the sentences in
the original study were: "A canary can sing," "A robin can fly," and
"An eagle has skin," then some of the sentences were transformed so that
there was only one step separating the subject noun and the property.
The transformed sentences were: "A canary can sing," "A bird can fly,"
and "An animal has skin." The cognitive economy hypothesis predicts that
RT for these three types of sentences should be equal, since the semantic
distance between the subject noun and the property is equal for all three
sentences.
This prediction was not confirmed. RT to the transformed level 1
property sentences like "A bird can fly," was significantly less than RT
to the other two types of property sentences. Collins and Quillian
(1972a) attributed tliis finding to a word frequency effect. They stated
that the subject nouns in the transformed level 1 sentences were high
frequency words. The use of a high frequency word reduces RT because it
facilitates word recognition.
Although Collins and Quillian ( 1972a) did not find equality in RT
among the three transformed sentences, reducing semantic distance did
have an effect. The RTs for the transformed level 1 and level 2 sen-
tences were lower than the RTs to the original sentences. Thus, "A
bird can fly," was responded to faster than "A robin can fly," and
"An animal has skin" was responded to faster than "An eagle has skin."
Collins and Quillian attributed this effect to a reduction in semantic
distance, but it may also be due to a word frequency effect.
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While this result does tend to confirm the cognitive economy
hypothesis, it is not inconsistent v/ith Conrad's (1972) property fre-
qiiency hypothesis. Conrad stated that the retrieval difficulty of
properties is not just a function of the specific property. Retrieval
difficulty for any given property can vary with the category. For
example, "has skin" may be a difficult property to retrieve for the
category "canary," hut it may be an easy property to retrieve for the
category "animal." Thus, she would not argue that for the transformed
sentences "A bird can fly," and "An animal has skin," RT will increase
as it did in the original study by Collins and Quillian (1969).
Iq summary, it seems that the results of these three experiments
indicate that there is not complete economy of property storage. Prop-
erties like "can fly" may be stored ^Arith "canary" as well as with "bird."
In discussing the development of the model, it has already been noted
that Collins and Quillian (1972b) have modified the model. "There is
nothing in the theory, however, that prevents storing superset properties
with particular instances, and we certainly think it is a common practice
[Collins and Quillian, 1972b, p. 345]." Rather than stating that prop-
erty sentences must be responded to on the basis of inference, i.e., by
traveling through the hierarchy, they state that they were merely trying
to demonstrate that such may be the case. In fact, "in constructing
sentences for our original study (Collins and Quillian, 1969) we made an
effort to choose instances (e.g., wren) where the superset property
Ce,g.^ has wings) was not particularly associated with the
instance.
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Hence, by design the sentences used were ones likely to be decided by
inference [Collins and Quillian, 1972b, p. 345]."
The Collins and Quillian position, then, with respect to criticisms
of their model seems to be that they are developing a model of competence
rather than of performance in one experimental situation.
Present Experiments
The present experiments concerned the nature of the tokens which
define a type node in the Collins and Quillian model. In their experi-
ments, Collins and Quillian (1969, 1970b) distinguished between property
and superset sentences. This distinction parallels the two types of tokens
which define a type node or word. It will be recalled that the first
token always provides superset or superordinate information. This is
followed by a set of "properties stating how the superset must be modified
to constitute the concept [word] intended [Quillian, 1969, p. 462]."
In testing the model, these two types of information were always
presented in syntactically different forms. Sentences which test super-
set information v/ere of the form "A (noun) is a (noun)." Property sen-
tences had three possible forms: (l) "A (noun) is (adjective)"; (2) "A
(noun) has (noun)"; and (3) "A (noun) can (verb)." Superset sentences
were found to have faster RTs than property sentences. Kintsch, et al.
(1970), however, were not able to replicate this effect. They found no
difference between property and superset sentences in RT.
Both of these studies, however, were subject to a confounding.
This confounding was between the "idea" being presented, and the syn-
tactic realization of this idea. When Collins and Quillian (1969) or
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Kintsch, et al. (1970) compared RTs to "A shark is a fish" and "A shark
is vicious," they were not only changing syntax, but they were also
changing semantic content. The question raised was whether one can
separate syntactic form from the semaritic content of a sentence.
One way to separate syntactic form from semantic content is to
keep semantic content constant, and vary syntactic form. That is, one
can present the same idea in two syntactic forms. For example, one can
present the sentences "A teacher is an educator" and "A teacher can
educate." Here we have the same idea, or at least very similar ideas,
presented in two syntactic forms.
RTs to sentence pairs like this would enahle one to distinguish
between two possible explanations of the Collins and Quillian (1969)
finding that superset sentences were faster than property sentences.
The two explanations are referred to as the syntactic hypothesis and
the semantic hypothesis.
The syntactic hypothesis states that the previously observed
difference in RT between property and superset sentences was due to their
syntax. This hypothesis predicts that if the same idea is presented in
two syntactic forms, then the superset realization of the idea is
easier. That is, "A teacher is an educator" has a faster RT than "A
teacher can educate."
The semantic hypothesis states that the previously observed dif-
ference in RT between property and superset sentences was due to their
semantic content. This hypothesis predicts no difference in RT between
66
the superset realization, "A teacher is an educator," and the property
realization, "A teacher can educate."
This paper presents two experiments. The first study was a
replication of Collins and Quillian's (1969) study. The results were
basically similar to those of Collins and Quillian. Since their general
findings proved reliable, a second experiment was done to test the semantic
and syntactic hypotheses.
In the second experiment, two-level hierarchies were constructed.
For each hierarchy, there were property relation and superset relation
sentences, where the terms property and superset relation refer to the
syntactic form of the sentence. There were two forms of each hierarchy.
In form A, a particular idea was expressed as a property sentence, and
in form B, that same idea was expressed as a superset sentence. All Ss
were presented with forms A and B, so that they responded to the same
idea in both syntactic forms.
The important effect for distinguishing between the two hypotheses
was the presence of a main effect for type of relation. The syntactic
hypothesis predicts a main effect for type of relation, specifically a
faster RT for superset relation sentences. The semantic hypothesis
predicts no difference in RT between property and superset relation sen-
tences .
Experiment 1: A Replication of Collins and Quillian (1969)
A pilot study replicating the Collins and Quillian (1969) experiment
was carried out, with two changes in design. Syntactic form was balanced
within the property sentences, so that there were equal numbers of "can
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(verb)," "has (noun)/' and "is (adjective)" sentences. The second change
concerned the variability in the predicates of the false sentences. All
tiie false sentences were constructed in a manner similar to that used by
Collins and Quillian (1969) where the level of contradiction was con-
trolled. A sample of these sentences was shown in Table 3.
It was thought that one explanation for the RT effects to false
sentences found by Collins and Quillian (1969) was that the false sen-
t^ces covered a wider range of the entire lexicon than did the true
sentences. In verifying true sentences, Ss may learn to narrow down the
area of the lexicon to be searched. Although Collins and Quillian (1969)
randomly presented sentences from three or four hierarchies of the lexicon
within a trial block, once the S encounters a true sentence, he can focus
on a particular area of the lexicon to search.
For example, if the first true sentence S sees is "An oak is a
tree," he can predict that within the same trial block he will again have
to search the "tree" area of the lexicon to find verifying information
about particular kinds of trees. S can also predict that he will have to
search for properties of trees in general, and if a three-level hierarchy
were used in the experiment, he will have to search for properties of
plants.
If, in the false sentences, Ss are trying to find the node which
contains the information in the predicate of the sentence, then the search
cannot be narrowed down to one area of lexicon. Assume that S is given
the false PI sentence, "A salmon can fly." This sentence predicates a
property of birds to a particular fish. S can first check the lexicon
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for properties of saLnon, then for properties of fish, and not find the
relevant information about what animal does fly. S can stop searching
now and respond "false," or he can continue searching the lexicon to
locate the node which does contain the property "can fly." If he continues
to search, he has no idea of the level at which to continue the search.
£can check properties of particular fish like "shark" or "tuna," or he
can check properties at the level of "bird" or "mammal," or he can continue
moving up the lexicon from "fish" to "animal" to "organism."
Given a false sentence, if S tries to locate the contradictory
information, there are many possible locations to search. Variability
in the location of contradictoiy information can lead to variability in
search strategies and consequently to variability in RTs.
To test this possibility, two forms of the sentences used in this
study were constructed. The main form is described first, and then the
alternate form.
Figure 5 shows a hierarchy from which true and false sentences about
kinds of fish were constructed. It was assumed that "fish," "mammal,"
"insect," and "reptile" are equivalent categories in terms of their
level in the hierarchy. That is, they all have "anijns-l" as their next
level category node. Table 4 shows sentences that were constructed from
the hierarchy.
Insert Figure 5 about here
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njisert Table 4 about here
A false PO sentence about a particular fish was constructed by
using a property of another fish, mammal, insect or reptile. "A herring
is dangerous- predicates a property of sharks. "A trout has a shell-
predicates a property of turtles. This second sentence was also con-
sidered a false PO sentence in that "trout" and "turtle" are at the same
level of the hierarchy. False PI sentences about kinds of fish were
constructed by predicating a property of mammals, insects, or reptiles.
The sentence in Table
-4, "A goldfish can crawl," predicates a property
of reptiles.
False SO sentences were constructed by using the name of another
fish, mammal, insect, or reptile. "A swordfish is a turtle" and "A
swordfish is a flounder" were both considered false SO sentences, since
"swordfish," "flounder," and "turtle" are at the same level of the
hierarchy. A false SI sentence stated that a particular fish was a
mammal, insect, or reptile.
Table 5 shows the eight sentences constructed as the alternate
forms of those in Table 4. These sentences were constructed by changing
Ihsert Table 5 about here
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Uie subject nouns of the sentences in Table I,, so that the true sentences
are now false, and false sentences are now true. The effect of this change,
it was hoped, would be to increase the area of the lexicon which the true
sentences cover. The true sentences in Table 5 have fish names, reptile
names, and insect names. With this form, if the S first sees "An ant is
an insect," he is not able to predict that the following true sentences
are also about specific kinds of insects. The primary purpose of using
this alternate form was to get more variability in the true sentences so
that Ss would not be able to predict what part of the lexicon the true
sentences were from.
Something of the opposite effect holds for the false sentences in
Table 5. If S first sees "A horse is a sardine," then he can predict that
the following predicates all come from that part of the lexicon relating
to fish, and so restrict his search of the lexicon somewhat.
Method
Subjects . Fifteen male and female undergraduates at the University
of Massachusetts participated as Ss to fulfill an introductory psychology
course requirement. Three Ss were eliminated because of equipment failures
during the experimental session.
Apparatus . Sentences were typed in capital letters on index cards
and slides were made of each card. Sentences were presented one at a time
by Kodak Carousel slide projector on an 18" x 24" screen. Each slide showed
white letters on a gray-black background. There were 10 to 29 letters per
sentence. Ss sat in a sound-proofed room facing the screen. On the table
in front of S was a six-button response panel. Two of the response buttons
7i
were labeled "TRUE" and "FALSE." Labeling of the right- and left-hand
response buttons was balanced across Ss. Below the screen a set of seven
alphanumeric Nixie tubes was used to inform Ss of the beginning and end of
S one-minute rest period between trial blocks. Presentation of stimuli
recording of responses was controlled by programming of a DEC PDP-8/I
computer
.
Sentences
.
Twelve two-level hierarchies were constructed. Many of
the true sentences were those originally used by Collins and Quillian
(1969) or were very similar. None of the false sentences used by them
were available, so these were constructed by predicating false properties
or category names at appropriate levels of the hierarchy. For each hierarchy,
there were eight sentences representing the following conditions: (l) true
property relation level 0, (2) true property relation level 1, (3) true
superset relation level 0, (4) true superset relation level 1, (5) false
property relation level 0, (6) false property relation level 1, (7) false
superset relation level 0, and (8) false superset relation level 1.
For the property sentences, one-third were "can (verb)" sentences,
one-third were "has (noun)" sentences, and one-third were "is (adjective)"
sentences. These three verb phrases appeared equally often for true and
false property sentences at levels 0 and 1.
From the initial set of twelve hierarchies, an alternate form was
constructed by the method previously described, so that an originally
false sentence was made true. For the original set of hierarchies, the
true sentences covered a narrow range of the lexicon, and in the alternate
form, the true sentences covered a broader range of the lexicon. The
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original set of hierarchies is referred to as the narrow range hierarchies,
and the alternate form as the broad range hierarchies.
Four additional sentence hierarchies, two narrow, and two broad,
(32 sentences) were constructed for practice trials.
To check on E's classification as true or false, the entire set
of 224 sentences, including practice sentences, was presented to eleven
psychology graduate students. Sentences were typed on sheets of paper,
sixteen sentences to a sheet. Each sentence was followed by a "T" or "F."
Ss were told to read each sentence and circle "T" or "F" if the sentence
was generally true or false. Ss were told to go through the list of sen-
tences fairly rapidly and not to spend too much time on any one. If they
could not come to a decision easily, they were to leave the item blank.
If any sentence received two out of eleven answers which differed
from E's classification, or were left blank, these sentences were changed
or new ones were substituted for them. Thirty-two sentences were changed
for either of these reasons. There was no further check on the thirty-two
sentences substituted for those deleted. The final set of 22L, sentences
used is shown in Table A of the Appendix.
Procedure . Practice and experimental sentences together constituted
seven blocks of tliirty-two sentences per block. Following each block of
sentences, "BREAK" appeared for seven seconds on the Nixie tubes. After
approximately 45 seconds, "READY" appeared on the Nixies for seven seconds,
and the next trial block of sentences was shown. Each sentence appeared
for two seconds^ followed by a blank screen for two seconds. S could
respond any time within the four second interval. An additional 300 msec.
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delay follovred the four second interval. This delay was interposed
between trials because of problems in programming the slide projector for
faster presentation rates. Responses occurring v/ithin this delay were
not recorded.
Ss were tested individually. Each S was told that sentences would
be presented for about two seconds followed by a blanJc screen for about two
seconds, and that they should respond as fast as they could within this
Interval. Ss were told to decide if the sentence was generally true or
generally false as rapidly and as accurately as possible, and then to
press the appropriate response button. Ss were told that there was a
rest period indicated by "BREAK" and "READY" on the Nixie tubes. At the
end of the practice block, E asked for questions. A few Ss were still
not sure how far to push the meaning of "true" and "false" and were told
not to search for remote or metaphorical meanings.
All Ss were shown 224- sentences. The same practice set was used for
all S_s. Practice sentences were presented in a different random order for
each S.
Following the practice block, six Ss were shown the 96 sentences
from the twelve narrow hierarchies followed by the 96 sentences from the
broad hierarchies. The other six Ss were shovm the sentences from the
broad hierarchies first, followed by the sentences from the narrow
hierarchies. The twelve hierarchies in each form v/ere randomly divided
into blocks of four hierarchies. The 32 sentences thus constituting a
block were randomly presented. Order of the three blocks of 32 sen-
tences was counterbalanced across Ss.
74
Results
Data corrections
.
In analyzing the RT data, a constant of 28 msec,
was subtracted from all scores. This was done to compensate for a lag
in shutter opening time.
The following RT data are for correct responses only. For those
trials on which S made an error or failed to respond, his mean RT for
that condition was substituted. Overall error rate was 1%, ranging from
0. 5^ to 15.4?^. This error rate includes failure to respond as well as
wrong responses. Mean error rate for wrong responses only was 6.2/S.
Error rates for experimental conditions are presented later.
Reaction time for correct responses
. Figure 6 shows the RTs for
true and false, property and superset relation sentences, at levels 0 and
1, averaged over broad and narrow hierarchies. The interaction among type
Insert Figure 6 about here
of relation (property and superset), truth value (true and false), and
level (0 and l) was significant, F(l, 10) = 8.81, p < .025, when analyzed
in an overall analysis of variance. (A fuller presentation of the results
of the analysis of variance appears later .
)
For the true sentences, property relation sentences had a higher
RT than superset relation sentences. Both property and superset relation
RTs increased from level 0 to level 1, the increase being greater for super-
set relation sentences. The effects shown in Figure 6 for true sentences
were fairly consistent for individual Ss and hierarchies. The relative
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position of the two curves was as predicted for eight out of twelve Ss,
and for^ nine out of twelve hierarchies
.
The difference between PO and PI, 124 msec, is an estimate of the
time to travel from a node to its superset node. In Collins and Quillian
(1969), this time was 75 msec. The increase in RT of 157 msec, from SI to
PI, is an estimate of the time to retrieve a property from a node. The
time estimated for this process by Collins and Quillian was 225 msec.
In the false sentences, there was a slight increase of 11 msec,
from level 0 to level 1 in RT for both property and superset relation
sentences. RT to property relation sentences v/as about 72 mesc. longer
than RT to superset relation sentences at both levels. While the changes
in RT for false sentences were consistent with those found for true sen-
tences, the effects were not stable across Ss or across hierarchies.
False property relation sentences were consistently higher than
superset relation sentences for six out of twelve Ss. For the other six Ss,
there were cross-over effects, with property relation sentences having higher
RTs at one level and superset relations having higher RTs at the other level.
RTs to false property relation sentences did not always increase from
level 0 to level 1 for all Ss. For eight Ss, there v;as an increase in RT
from level 0 to level 1, and RT decreased from level 0 to level 1 for four
Ss, RTs for false superset relation sentences increased from level 0 to
level 1 for six S^s, and decreased from level 0 to level 1 for six Ss.
RTs to false sentences for the individual hierarchies showed con-
sistently higher RTs to property relations at both levels for five out of
twelve hierarchies. For five hierarchies, property relations had higher
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RTs at one level, and for two hierarchies, superset relation RTs were
higher at both levels. RTs to property relation sentences increased from
level 0 to level 1 in seven out of twelve hierarchies, and decreased from
level 0 to level 1 in five out of twelve hierarchies. RTs to superset
relation sentences increased from level 0 to level 1 in six hierarchies,
and decreased in six hierarchies.
OveT^Bll analysis o£ variance results on RT data
. Table 6 shows the
results of an analysis of variance on RT for the following variables:
(1) range of the hierarchy, narrow and broad; (2) order of presentation of
the forms, narrow then broad and broad then narrow; (3) type of relation,
property and superset relation; (4) truth value, true and false; (5)
hierarchical level, level 0 and level 1; and (6) hierarchy, twelve
hierarchies covering different semantic content areas.
Insert Table 6 about here
The following significant main effects were found, (l) RT to super-
set sentences, 1365 msec, was significantly lower than RT to property
sentences, 1525 msec, F(l,10) = 42.32, p < .001. (2) RT to true sentences,
1390 msec, was significantly less than RT to false sentences, 1500 msec,
F(l,10) = 46.72, < .001. (3) RT significantly increased with hierarchi-
cal level, from 1339 msec for level 0, to 1501 msec, for level 1 sentences,
F(l,10) = 111.04, p < .001. (4) RT varied significantly among the twelve
hierarchies, F(ll, 110) = 6.47, p < .025. RT varied from 1314 msec, for
hierarchy four, to 1583 msec for hierarchy five. Hierarchy four (see
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Table A of Appendix) was based on birds, and hierarchy five was based on
medical specialities. Hierarchy five contained the longest sentences used.
Neither the range of the hierarchies, narrow or broad, nor the order
in which they were presented had a significant effect. However, these two
variables did interact significantly, F(l,10) = 14.69, p < .005. The
narrow form had the longest RT when presented first, 1529 msec, and the
shortest RT, 1368 msec, when presented second. In contrast to this de-
crease of 261 msec, the RT for the broad hierarchies decreased only 72
msec, from 1477 msec when they came first, to I405 msec, when they came
second.
The range variable was included in the present study to determine
if the changes in RT for false sentences found by Collins and Quillian
(1969) were related to differences in search strategies for true and false
sentences. It was thought that with false sentences, Ss search a wider
range of the lexicon to find contradictions. This hypothesis would be
supported if range of hierarchy interacted with truth value, or if range
interacted with truth value, level, and type of relation. Neither of these
interactions was significant.
For both narrow and broad hierarchies, RT to true sentences was
1390 msec For false sentences, RT was 1508 msec, for narrow, and 1492
msec for broad hierarchies. This difference, while in the expected
direction, is small.
As stated, the type of relation by level by truth value interaction
depicted in Figure 6 did not change significantly when the range variable
was included. For true sentences, the means were essentially the same for
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both narrow and broad hierarchies. For false sentences, there were slight
changes in RT for narrow and broad hierarchies.
Table 7 shows the cell means for all combinations of range, order
of presentation of forms, type of relation, truth value, and hierarchical
level.
Insert Table 7 about here
RT data for property relation sentences
. An analysis of variance
was done on the property relation sentence RTs only, to determine if the
three verb phrases used had different effects on RT. The variables in
the analysis were: (l) range, narrow and broad; (2) order of presentation
of ranges, narrow then broad and broad then narrow; (3) truth value, true
and false; (4) hierarchical level, level 0 and level 1, and (5) verb phrase,
"has (noun)," "can (verb)," and "is (adjective)." Results of the analysis
are shown in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 about here
Verb phrase was significant, F(2,20) = 3.60, p < .05. The shortest
RT, 1^93 msec, was for "can (verb)" property relations. RT for "is (ad-
jective)" was slightly higher, 1503 msec, and RT for "has (noun)" v/as
1573 msec.
There was a significant interaction among verb phrase, hierarchical
level, and truth value, F(2,20) = 4.27, p < .05. Figure 7 shows that for
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true sentences, RT increased for each of the three verb phrase property
relation sentences. The largest increase in RT was for "can (verb)"
sentences which increased I84 msec, from level 0 to level 1. "Is
(adjective)" sentences increased 107 msec, and "has (noun)" sentences
increased 80 msec.
Insert Figure 7 about here
For false property relation sentences, RT for "has" and "is" sentences
increased 153 and 109 msec, respectively. However, for "can" sentences,
RT decreased 125 msec, from level 0 to level 1.
Error rates for sentence conditions . Figure 8 shows the mean propor-
tion of errors for true and false, property and superset relation sentences
for levels 0 and 1. For true sentences, increases in errors paralleled
increases in RT for correct responses. That is, errors were higher for
Insert Figure 8 about here
property relation sentences than for superset relation sentences. Errors
increased from level 0 to level 1, and the increase in errors was greater
for superset relation sentences than for property relation sentences.
For false sentences, errors also increased from level 0 to level 1
for both property and superset relation sentences. However, there was a
slight cross-over in the data. At level 0, property relation sentences
liad a higher error rate, but at level 1, superset relations had the higher
error rate.
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Figure 9 shows the proportion of errors for the true and false
property relation sentences using the three different kinds of predicates.
For the true sentences, proportion of errors increased for "can (verb)"
and "is (adjective)" sentences, but decreased for "has (noun)" sentences
from level 0 to level 1. For the false sentences, proportion of errors
increased for the "can (verb)" and "has (noun)" sentences, but was constant
for the "is (adjective)" sentences from level 0 to level 1.
Insert Figure 9 about here
Discussion
The results showed a fairly clear replication of the Collins and
Quillian (1969) data. The relative position of the property and superset
relation curves and the increase in RT with hierarchical level confirmed
the effects found previously for true sentences. The effects held over
the wider range of sentences used in the present study. Furthermore, the
data for individual Ss indicated that the effects were not due to averaging.
The major divergence between the results of the present study and
those of the Collins and Quillian (1969) study was in the absolute values
of RT. RTs in the present study were generally longer than those reported
by Collins and Quillian (1969). The estimates for time to retrieve proper-
ties, and time to move between levels, differed. In the present study, it
took more time to move between levels, 124- msec, and less time to retrieve
properties, 157 msec. The comparable data for Collins and Quillian were
75 msec, and 225 msec.
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Results for false sentences were not clear. Apparently, property
relation sentences had longer RTs than superset relation sentences. This
general result confirmed that reported by Collins and Quillian (1969).
However, changes in RT were not consistent across Ss or across hierarchies.
Apparently, RTs to false sentences did not vary with differences in the
range of the lexicon S searched. RTs to false sentences did not differ
when S was searching narrow or broad hierarchies.
Results on variation in verb phrase or property relation sentences
indicated that syntactic differences of the kind used here had some effect
on RT. "Has (noun)" sentences had the longest RTs. These sentences are
superficially similar to superset relation sentences in that both contain
a noun in the verb phrase. Since "has (noun)" sentences had the longest
RTs, it is not the mere presence of a noun in the verb phrase which makes
superset relation sentences easiest to process.
All true property relation sentences showed increases in RT regardless
of verb phrase. An unexplained effect was that RT decreased from level 0
to level 1 for false "can (verb)" sentences. These level 1 sentences might
possibly have been simpler than the level 0' sentences, for some reason.
However, if the proportion of errors is an indication of sentence difficulty,
then there was no support for this explanation. There was no decrease in
errors corresponding to the decrease in RT for false "can (verb)" sentences.
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Experiment Two
The purpose of experiment two was to determine whether the previously
obtained difference
.in RT between property and superset sentences was due
to the syntactic differences between the sentences, or the different ideas
the two sentence types express. These two hypotheses, the syntactic and
the semantic, were tested by presenting similar ideas in two syntactic
forms, e.g., "A teacher can educate" and "A teacher is an educator." The
syntactic hypothesis predicts a difference in the RT to these two sen-
tences, and the semantic hypothesis predicts no difference in RT to these
two sentences
»
Method
Experimental sentences
. IVelve two-level hierarchies were constructed.
The semantic content of all hierarchies concerned roles or occupations, e.g.,
writers, businessmen, athletes. Figure 10 shows a two-level hierarchy on
writers and Table 9 shows the sixteen sentences which were constructed on
the basis of this hierarchy.
Insert Figure 10 about here
Insert Table 9 about here
Sentences one through eight were true sentences and sentences nine
through sixteen were false. The P or S before each sentence indicates the
type of relation, property or superset. Superset relation sentences were
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of the form, "A (noun) is a (noun)." Property sentences were of the form,
-A (noun) is (adjective)," or "A (noun) can (verb)." Property sentences
of the form "A (noun) has (noun)," which were used in the pilot study,
were eliminated because they had the highest RTs. The true sentences
were constructed with regard to hierarchical level and are marked level 0,
level 0', and level 1. (The meaning of the levels is explained later.)
The false sentences were constructed without regard to level of contradic-
tion.
Besides the hierarchy shown in Figure 10, eleven other hierarchies
were constructed with sixteen sentences per hierarchy, for a total of 192
sentences. Half of the sentences made up form A (left column of Table 9)
and the other 96 sentences constituted form B (right column of Table 9).
Each row of Table 9 shows the sentences as semantically corresponding
sentence sets. Set 1 consisted of the property sentences of form A, and
their semantically corresponding sentences which were superset sentences
in form B. Set 2 consisted of those sentences which were superset sentences
in form A, and their semantic correspondents, the property sentences of
form B.
.
~
In the experiment, Ss saw all of form A and then all of form B, or
vice versa. The sentences in Table 9 are shown grouped by forms and by
sets. However, the comparison of property and superset sentences within
a set was more critical in this experiment than was the comparison of
property and superset sentences within a form.
While the hierarchy in Figure 10 shows just two levels, the true
sentences in Table 9 are marked for three possible levels, 0, 0', and 1.
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This classification of levels was sometimes the same and sometimes different
from the classification used by Collins and Quillian (1969).
1.. The superset level 0 sentences, SO, were similar to the superset
level 0 sentences used by Collins and Quillian (1969).
2.. The superset and property level 1 sentences, SI and PI, were
similar to those used by Collins and Quillian (1969).
3. The property level 0 sentences, PO, were different. In the
Collins and Quillian (1969) study, a PO sentence contained information
about properties specific to that word. In the present experiment, a PO
classification resulted from trying to express the same information
presented in an SO sentence, in a property relation sentence form.
Therefore, sentence (l) in Table 9 was constructed because there were
sentences like sentence (2).
4. The property level 0' sentences, PO', as in sentence (6),
corresponded to the Collins and Quillian (1969) property level 0 sentence.
That is, sentence (6) in this experiment contained property information
that was specific to playwrights, i.e., that they "can dramatize."
5. The superset level 0' sentences, SO', as in sentence (5), were
used because they were the semantic correspondents to the PO' sentences.
The main difference between the presented sentences and those used
"by Qollins and Quillian, was in the classification of level 0 sentences,
the present experiment, there were two types of level 0 sentences.
In the sentence hierarchy shown in Table 9, there are PI and SI
sentences in both forms A and B. However, form A has a PO sentence but
no PC sentence, and an SO' sentence but no SO. There were six hierarchies
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in fom A li^e this. The other six hierarchies in form A had a PO-
sentence but no PO, and had an SO sentence hut no SO'. Each hierarchy
had either a level 0 or a level 0- sentence. Table 10 summarizes the
total number of each type of sentence in each form.
Insert Table 10 about here
Practice sentences. An additional group of 32 sentences, represent-
ing two hierarchies, were constructed for use as practice sentences to
familiarize Ss with the task.
Standardization of sentences
. To determine the validity of E '
s
judgment on the truth and falsity of the sentences, lists of sentences were
presented to groups of Ss to be scored true or false. In the pilot study,
the error rate per S was 7%, indicating some disagreement with E's judg-
ment. Collins and Quillian (1969) reported an error rate of S%, Therefore,
sentences were selected until an acceptable error rate of about 7% was
reached.
In the first standardization group, Ss were presented with a booklet
containing 276 sentences to be marked true or false. The sentence types
were randomly arranged in the booklet. The first group of Ss were ten
high school students who were paid $1.25 for participating.
On the top sheet of the booklet was an instruction sheet which read
as follows:
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Read each sentence and decide if you think it is
a generally true or generally false statement. If
true circle the T after the sentence. If false, circlethe F.
For example, if the sentence reads:
'A warrior is aggressive' T F
you would circle the T. If the statement 'reads:
A warrior is gentle T F
you would circle the F.
'
If you read a sentence and can't make a decision
fairly quickly, leave it blank and go on to the next
sentence.
If you can't make a decision because you don't
understand one of the words in the sentence, circle the
word you don't understand, and leave it blank.
Ss worked at their own pace and a session lasted from 20 to 60
minutes.
The mean proportion of errors in the first group was .21 per S,
with scores ranging from a low of .04 to a high of .57.
Since this error rate was considered too high, the sentences were
modified, deleted or new ones were added and a new booklet of 264 sen-
tences randomly arranged was made. These sentences were presented to a
group of three high school students who were paid $1.25 for participating.
Instructions and other conditions were the same as for the previous group.
The mean proportion of errors for the second group was .14 per S,
with scores ranging form a low of .12 to a high of .17. This error rate
was still considered too high, so further changes were made in the sen-
tences.
A- modified set of 246 sentences was presented to a group of seven
Ss. One S was a high school student, paid $1.25 for participating, and
six Ss were psychology graduate students who volunteered to participate.
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Other conditions and instructions were the same as for the two previous
groups
.
Mean proportion errors on the 2^6 sentences was
.03 per S, ranging
from
.01 to .05. From these 2^6 sentences, a set of 22^ sentences were
selected to be used in the experiment. The mean proportion of errors was
.03 per S for the final set of sentences. Proportion of errors on the 32
sentences selected for the practice trials was .035 per S, and the propor-
tion errors on the 192 experimental sentences was .025. Most of the errors
were due to one S making an error on a single sentence, hut in three cases
two Ss made an error on the same sentence.
Table B (see Appendix) shows the final set of practice and experi-
mental sentences.
Subjects
.
Forty-one undergraduate students at the University of
Massachusetts were Ss. The design of the study required 21^ Ss. However,
the additional 17 Ss were run because equipment problems resulted in the
loss of data from some Ss. For other Ss, data was lost because of equip-
ment problems coupled with high error rates. Ss were paid $1.25 to
participate in a session which lasted approximately 45 minutes.
Apparatus
.
Preparation of the sentences on slides, the Ss' T«esponse
panel, and programming of the equ-ipment were the same as described in the
pilot study.
Procedure . In most respects, the procedure was the same as in the
pilot study. Sentences were presented in blocks of 32, beginning with a
practice block of 32 sentences. There was a one-minute break between trial
blocks, which was signaled by the words "BREAK" and "READY" on the Nixie
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tubes below the screen. Each sentence appeared for two seconds, followed
by a blank screen for two seconds. Ss were required to respond within
this four second period. There was a one second delay before the presen-
tation of the next sentence.
Twelve of the Ss were shown the sentences constituting form A first,
followed by form B, and the other twelve Ss were shown form B first,
followed by form A.
A block of 32 trials consisted of the random presentation of
sentences from four of the twelve hierarchies within a particular form.
Various randomization and balancing procedures were used to insure that
the twelve hierarchies were not always presented in the same sequence.
Instructions
.
Ss were read the following instructions.
You'll see a series of sentences one at a time.
You should decide if each sentence is generally true or
generally false. Once you've decided 'true' or 'false,'
press the corresponding button.
Each sentence will be on for two seconds, then a
blank screen for two seconds. You can answer as soon
as you decide 'true' or 'false,' but it has to be within
the four second period. At the end of the four seconds,
another sentence will come on and you'll have to respond
to that one. So, if you haven't responded by the time the
next sentence comes on, forget about it, and only respond
to the sentence that is being presented.
At the end of 32 sentences, there'll be a one-minute
break, and you can relax for a while.
The first set of sentences will be for practice so
that you can get used to the timing of the slides and
learn which button to push for 'true' and which button to
push for 'false.
'
Answer as quickly and accurately as you can in
deciding if the statement is generally true or false.
Any questions?
E returned after the practice block to see if S had any questions.
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Results
RT data. Table 11 shows the results of an analysis of variance
done on the mean RT to true and false property and superset sentences.
There were eight mean RTs from each of the 24 Ss. These eight mean RTs
consisted of the RTs to the four sentence types presented in form A,
(true property, true superset, false property, and false superset), and
the RTs to the four sentence types again presented in form B. The four
variables included in the analysis were: (l) form, A and B; (2) order
of forms, AB order and BA order; (3) truth value, true and false sen-
tences; and (4) type of relation, property and superset sentences. (The
hierarchical level variable was meaningful only for true sentences and
is discussed later.)
Insert Table 11 about here
The syntactic hypothesis predicts that property sentences have
higher RTs than superset sentences. RT to property sentences was ISIB
msec, and RT for superset sentences was 1807 msec, a difference of only
11 msec, which was not significant, F(l,22) = 0.53.
A significant main effect was found for truth value, F(l,22) = 19.82,
£ < .001. RT for true sentences was 1737 msec, and RT for false sen-
tences was 1888 msec. As shown in Figure 11, truth value interacted with
type of relation, F(l,22) = 5.04, £ < .05. For true sentences, property
relations took 38 msec, longer to respond to than superset relations.
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This reversed for false sentences, where superset relations took 17 msec,
longer than property relations.
Insert Figure 11 about here
A significant interaction between form and type of relation,
F(1,22) = 12.31, p < .005, is shown in Figure 12. The interaction shown
was that in form A, RT for superset sentences was 38 msec, longer than
RT for property sentences. When the syntax of the form A sentences was
changed, so that the property sentences of form A became the superset
sentences of form B, and vice versa, then the relative position of the
superset and property RTs reversed. In form B, RT for superset sentences
was 59 msec, faster than RT for property sentences.
Insert Figure 12 about here
This same effect is also shown
Figure 13 shows the RTs grouped with
rather than with respect- to form and
in Figure 13, perhaps more clearly,
respect' to set and type of relation
type of relation. The sentences
Insert Figure 13 about here
of set 1, it will be recalled, consisted of property sentences of form A,
and their semantic counterparts, which were the superset sentences of
form B. Set 2 consisted of the superset sentences of form A, and their
semantic counterparts, which were the property sentences in form B.
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The mean RT for set 1 was 1788 msec, and 1837 msec, for set 2.
This difference was significant, F(l,22) = 12.31, p < .005.
As can be seen from Figure 13, there was no difference in RT between
the property and superset sentences of set 2. For set 1, the RT for
property sentences averaged 22 msec, longer than for their superset counter-
parts. This difference of 22 msec, was not significant using a Txikej test
for multiple comparisons.
Figures 12 and 13, then, indicate that syntactic differences
between sentence pairs did not have a major effect on RT.
Table 11 also shows that there was a significant form by order of
forms interaction, F(l,22) = 61.89, p < .001. This interaction, shown
in Figure 14, was interpreted as a practice effect. In the AB order
group, form A was shown first, and apparently this resulted in the longer
RT for form A. In the BA order group, form B was shown first, and form B
had the longer RT for these Ss.
Insert Figure 14- about here
This practice effect was somewhat different for true and false
sentences as indicated by the significant interaction among forms, order
of forms, and truth value, F( 1,22 ) = 4.40, £ < .05. Figure 15 shows the
interaction among fonns, order of forms, and truth value.
Insert Figure 15 about here
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To study the effect of hierarchical level, an analysis of variance
was done on data for true sentences, since only true sentences were con-
structed with regard to hierarchical level. The data consisted of twelve
RTs from each of the 24 Ss, six RTs from form A and six RTs from form B.
The sentence types represented in each form were, T-PO, T-PO', T-Pl, T-SO,
T-SO', and T-Sl. The RTs of each S for the T-PO, T-PO', T-SO, and T-SO'
sentences were based on six RTs, since there were six hierarchies that con-
tained level 0 sentences, and six hierarchies that contained level 0'
sentences. The RTs for each S for the T-Pl and T-Sl sentences were based
upon twelve RTs, since each of the twelve hierarchies contained level 1
sentences. The variables in the analysis of variance shown in Table 12
were: (l) form, A and B; (2) order of forms, AB order and BA order;
(3) type of relation, property and superset; and (4) level of hierarchy,
level 0, and level 0', and level 1.
Insert Table 12 about here
RT increased with hierarchical level. RT at level 0 was 1522 msec.
RT increased 264 msec, to 1786 msec, at level 0'. There was a further in-
crease of 38 msec, to 1824 msec, at level 1. The effect for level was
significant, F(2,44) = 61.28, p < .001. Only the RT for level 0 sentences
was significantly different from the other two RTs by a Tulcey test for
multiple comparisons.
The RT for property sentences was 1725 msec, and the RT for superset
sentences was 1696 msec. As in the previous analysis of variance, there was
not a significant effect for type of relation, F(1,22) = 3.89-
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Table 12 also shows that there was a significant form by order of
for^s interaction,F(l,22)
= 40.89, £< .001. This interaction was similar
to that previously shown in Figure 13, and was interpreted as a practice
effect.
Figure 16 shows the RT for property and superset relation sentences
in forms A and B. In form A, superset sentences had an 11 msec, higher RT
than property sentences. In form B, property sentences had a 69 msec,
higher RT than superset sentences. This interaction was significant,
F(l,22) = 7.03, £< .025. This type of interaction, along with the absence
of a main effect for type of relation, was consistent with the semantic
hypothesis, when set 1 sentences are easier than set 2 sentences. Since
set 1 had a significantly faster RT than set 2 sentences, F(l,22) = 7.03,
£< .025, the data again seemed to support the semantic hypothesis.
Insert Figure 16 about here
That is, the form by type of relation interaction shown in Figure
16 seemed to be due to the fact that the superset sentences in form B
were responded to faster than the superset sentences in form A. Figure
17 shows the RTs to true property and superset sentences grouped accord-
ing to set rather than form. There was no significant interaction between
sets and type of relation, F(l,22) = 0.28.
Insert Figure 17 about here
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So far the data presented have tended to support the semantic
hypothesis,
-mere were two other significant interactions, indicated
in Table 12, which complicated the interpretation of the results some-
what.
Figure 18 shows the RTs for property and superset sentences as a
function of hierarchical level. At levels 0 and 1 property sentences
had higher RTs than superset sentences. At level 0' superset sentences
had higher RTs than property sentences. This interaction was significant,
F(2,44) = 8.94, p < .001. Using a TuJiey multiple comparison test, it
was found that there was a significant increase in RT from level 0 to
level 0', and from level 0' to level 1 for property sentences. For super-
set sentences, RT significantly increased from level 0 to level 0', but
not from level 0' to level 1. In fact, there was a slight, 17 msec,
decrease in RT from level 0' to level 1 for superset sentences.
Insert Figure 18 about here
Figure 19 shows the RTs for property and superset sentences at each
hierarchical level in forms A and B. From inspection of Figure 19, it
Insert Figure 19 about here
seemed that the type of relation by level interaction changed from form A
to fonn B. This interaction was significant, F(2,44) = 4.15, p < .025.
The change in interaction with forms seemed to be due to what occurred at
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level 1. In for. A at level 1, the superset sentences had the higher RT
Whereas in for. B at level 1, the property sentences had the higher RT
'
At levels 0 andO', the relative positions of the superset and property
RTs were the sa.e in hoth fo^s A and B. It was apparently this reversal
at level 1 of the superset and property sentences which was the hasis of
the observed interaction between for.s and type of relation previously
discussed (see Figure 16).
While this interaction seemed to be very complex. Figure 20 shows
how it was made to disappear. Figure 20 shows the RTs to property and
superset relations at each hierarchical level, grouping the data on the
basis of set rather than on the basis of form. The set by type of relation
by hierarchical level interaction was not significant, F(2,44) = 0.97.
That is, the type of relation by hierarchical level interaction shown in
'
Figure 18 was the same for sentence sets 1 and 2. Since grouping the sen-
tences by sets was a more pertinent comparison than grouping by forms, the
interaction depicted in Figure 19 was ignored.
Insert Figure 20 about here
To summarize the important effects thus far, it seemed that when
RTs to property and superset sentences were contrasted with the RTs to
their semantic counterparts, the same type of interaction emerged. At
levels 0 and 1, property sentences had higher RTs than their superset
counterparts. At level 0', however, supersets had higher RTs than their
property counterparts. This can be seen in Figures 18 and 20.
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l^e level 0 and level 1 data indicated support for the syntactic
hypothesis, since property sentences had the higher RTs at these levels.
However, the high RT for level 0' superset sentences, indicated that some
types of information were more difficult to handle when presented in the
syntactic form of a superset sentence, than when presented in the syntactic
form of a property sentence.
The overall results of the first analysis of variance discussed,
(see Table 11), indicated general support of the semantic hypothesis, i.e.,
that the content of the sentence had a greater effect on RT than the syn-
tax. However, the results of the second analysis of variance, which
included the hierarchical level variable, indicated support for a compromise
position. That is, the syntax of a sentence influences RT, but not in the
simple straightforward way predicted by the syntactic hypothesis.
Several additional analyses were done to try and get more information
about the basis of the type of relation by hierarchical level interaction.
Since RTs were generally longer in this experiment than in the pilot
study, an analysis of variance was done to determine if the Ss' speed of
responding interacted with any of the other variables. Using overall
median RT as a dividing point, Ss were split into two groups, fast and
slow responders. Table 13 shows the results of an analysis of variance on
RT data which included the following variables: (l) speed of responding,
fast and slow; (2) form, A and B; (3) type of relation, property and super-
set; and (4-) truth value, true and false.
Insert Table 13 about here
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Figure 21 shows the mean RTs for fast and slow responders to true
and false, property and superset relation sentences in forms A and B.
The interaction was significant, F(l, 22) - 5.39, ^ < .05
Insert Figure 21 about here
Table U shows the results of an analysis of variance on RT for
true sentences only. The variables in the analysis were: (l) speed of
responding, fast and slow; (2) type of relation, property and superset;
(3) form, A and B; and (4) hierarchical level, level 0, level 0', and
level 1.
Insert Table 14 about here
The data represented in Table 14 show that speed of responding
did not interact significantly with the other variables in a way that
seemed related to the type of relation by hierarchical level interaction
shown in Figure 18.
Generally, the results of the last two analyses reported indicated
that the trends reported thus far held for fast and slow responders.
In the next two analyses of variance, the between-hierarchy variability
in the RT data was investigated. Each datum was the standard deviation of
a set of RT scores. These were the same scores that were used for calcu-
lating the mean RTs of each S in the previous analyses. It will be
recalled that the RTs on which the mean RT was calculated, were the RTs
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to sentences which were all of the sa.e sentence type, hut fro. different
hierarchies. RTgD was the variability in this set of RTs.
Tahle 15 shows the results of an analysis of variance done on RT^j,
for true and false sentences. The variables were: (l) for., A and
(2) order of fox^s, AB order and BA order; (3) type of relation, property
and superset; and (4) truth value, true and false.
Insert Table 15 about here
Hie mean RT^^ was 403 msec. Comparison of the data in Table 15 with
that in Table 11, shows that increases in mean RT were not always accom-
panied by corresponding changes in RTq-q.
Of the two significant interactions, the one of interest was the
form by type of relation interaction, depicted in Figure 22. Comparison
Insert Figure 22 about here
of Figure 22 to Figure 12 shows that as the mean RTs increased, so did
the variability of scores on which the means were calculated, F(l,22) = 15.35,
p < .001. This interaction again was interpreted as a main effect for
sentence set. Set 1 (property sentences in A and superset sentences in
B) showed less variability in RTs than did set 2 (superset sentences in
A and property sentences in B. )
Table 16 shows the results of an analysis of variance on RT^-^ for
true sentences only, where the variables included were: (l) form, A arid B;
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(2) order of fo^s. AB order and BA order; (3) type of relation, property
and superset; and (4) hierarchical level, level 0, level 0', and level 1.
Insert Table 16 about here
RTsD increased from 302 msec, at level 0, to 343 msec, at level 0',
to 3B9 mesc. at level 1. This hierarchical level effect was significant,
F(2,44)
= 13.83, p < .001. That is, there was more variability in the RT
between hierarchies as hierarchical level increased. There seemed to be
three possible explanations for this increase in variability with hierarchi-
cal level. The increase in variability may have been due to the informa-
tion stored in memory. That is, the further away one gets from level 0
information, the less likely it is that Ss' memory is organized like E's
(the person who made up the hierarchies). Secondly, the increase in
variability may have been due to increased variability in Ss ' search
strategies as distance from level 0 information increases. Thirdly, dif-
ferences between E and Ss in actual information available might necessi-
tate the use of different search strategies."
This analysis was done partly to get more information on the inter-
action between hierarchical level and type of relation (see Table 12 and
Figure IS). While the trend in the RTgD indicated that variability increased
with increases in RT, as shown in Figure 23 the interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(2,44) = 2.51.
Insert Figure '23 about here
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A series of experiments by Klntsoh (1972) suggested that lexical
complexity provides a partial explanation for some of the RT differences
observed between property and superset sentences. Lexical complexity refers
to whether a word may be decomposed into simpler elements. For example,
"soul" is lexically simpler than "ability." A sunmary of Kintsch's experi-
ments is first presented, and then the present data are considered In terms
of lexical complexity.
Kintsch (1972) found that lexical complexity affected paired-
associate learning. In learning lists of nouns and digits, Ss made fewer
errors when the nouns were lexically simple. Kintsch further investigated
two possible origins of the lexical complexity effect. One explanation
of the results was that lexically derived nouns, e.g., "ability," were
difficult because Ss had to reduce them to simpler elements. This re-
duction process might have interfered with paired-associate learning. A
second explanation, which Kintsch tested, was that Ss reduced the lexically
derived nouns to simpler elements which may be verbs or adjectives. Ss
then learned the paired-associate lists, but treated the lexically derived
nouns as if they were simpler verbs or adjectives. The reason for the
greater difficulty of the lexically complex paired-associate lists in con-
trast to the lexically simple noun lists, was that paired-associate
learning was more difficult with verbs and adjectives than with nouns.
To test these explanations, Kintsch (1972) presented paired-associate
lists with either simple nouns or with verbs and adjectives from which the
lexically complex nouns derive. Ss made more errors learning the verb and
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adjective lists, than in learning the simple noun lists, a result
supporting the second hypothesis.
Although lexical complexity was not systematically controlled
the present experiment, the sentence pairs were examined to determine
whether there were any systematic differences in the lexical complexity
of the predicate nouns in the superset sentences versus the predicate
verbs and adjectives in the property sentences.
The 48 sentence pairs used in the experiment were classified as to
whether the predicate noun, verb or adjective was lexically simple or
derived. With respect to superset and property sentences, four categories
were differentiated.
1. It was found that in 27 of the 48 sentence pairs, the property
sentences had the lexically simpler form of the word in the predicate.
For example, "A mechanic can repair" was considered lexically simpler
than "A mechanic is a repairman." According to Kintsch's lexical
complexity hypothesis, these 27 property sentences should have had faster
RTs than their superset counterparts.
2. In 9 of the 48 sentence pairs, the superset sentences had the
lexically simpler word in the predicate, as in the set "A poet is a
poet," and "A poet is poetic." For these sentence pairs, the lexical com-
plexity hypothesis predicts faster RTs for the superset sentences.
3. In 7 of the 48 sentence pairs, both the property and superset
predicate words seemed to be derived from a simpler word. In the set "A
playwright can dramatize" and "A playwright is a dramatist," both "dramatize"
and "dramatist" would derive from the lexically simpler "drama."
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Unless one starts to consider degree of derivation, it seemed that for
these sentence pairs, the lexical complexity hypothesis predicts no
difference in RT between superset and property sentences.
A. In 5 of the 48 sentence pairs, the same word, whether it was
lexically simple or lexically complex, was used in both the property and
superset sentences. For example, in the sentence pair "A mm-derer is
criminal" and "A murderer is a criminal," the same lexically derived
word was used in both the property and superset sentences.
Table 17 shows the RT differences between the property and superset
Insert Table 17 about here
sentence pairs which fell into these four categories for level 0, 0',
and 1. For example, row one of Table 17 shows the RT to property and
superset sentences in those pairs where the property sentences had the
lexically simpler form of a word than the superset sentences. At level 0,
there were eight sentence pairs which fell into this category, and the RT
to the property and superset sentences is shown as well as the RT dif-
ference. The number in parentheses below the RT differences gives the
number of sentences the difference is based on. The final column of
Table 17 shows the overall RTs to property and superset sentences, and
the RT differences for each sentence pair category.
The data in the first two rows of Table 17 are most relevant to
Kintsch's (1972) lexical complexity hypothesis. While the number of
sentence pairs in some cells is only one, and the differences in RT
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were small, the direction of the differences in pt w' Ki between property and
superset sentences was as predicted by the 1... .
•Hlcal complexity hypothesis.
For example, there were 27 sentence pat,.,^ wh. .-vf h where the verb or
adjective of the property sentences was lexi.nn •
.x xiofiiiy simpler than the noun
of the superset sentence. For these sentencn, .
'h the RT for the property
sentences was 56 mesc. less than the RT for ii
'liG superset sentences. On
the other hand, when the noun of the superset
^ sentences was lexically
simpler than the verb or adjective of the pr.^^^tv^ 'Perty sentence, superset
sentences had a 233 msec, faster RT.
This patterns of results, whiich d-pp n ^ . ,
'
ni n IS predicted by Kintsch's (1972)
lexical complexity hypothesis, held at each
I, Urarchical level.
The pattern of RT differences also sug^n^f^A
"^^Kosted ohat nouns are easier
than verbs and adjectives. This conclusion
^^^^^^^
parisons. When the property sentences were U^xically simpler, the RT
difference was 56 msec. However, when the superset sentences were lexi-
cally simpler, the RT difference was even gm.ter, i.e., 233 msec. The
data in rows three and four of Table 17 supp.,,,ed the idea that nouns are
easier than verbs or adjectives. It can be
...,en in row three, that when
both the superset and property sentences conl.aned derived words, the
superset or noun sentences were easier, i.e..
^ rt difference of 87 msec.
Similarly, in row four of Table 17, it can b. seen that when both property
and superset sentences contained the same wo,.,i, the sentences were easier
when the word was used as a noun than when ii, v,as used as a verb or adjec-
tive. The RT difference here was 22 msec.
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«Mle the patte™ of RT differences suggested that sentences with
lezicall. Simple words, and sentences with nouns, whether simple or de-
rived, have faster RTs generally, this did not see. to hold for level 0'
sentences. Consider the RT differences fro. rows three and four at level
0', in contrast to the overall RT differences for these rows. At level
0', When both property and superset predicates contained derived words,
the property sentences were faster by 83 msec. Similarly, when the
property and superset sentences contained the sarae word, the property
sentences were faster by 82 .sec. These differences contradict the over-
all differences for these rows.
Therefore, at level 0', it seemed that property sentences were
easier than superset sentences, whereas at levels 0 and 1, superset sen-
tences were easier. The origins of this effect may lie in the way level
0' property sentences and superset sentences were constructed. The
level 0- property sentences presented property information pertinent to
a specific instance, e.g., "A canary can sing." The level 0' superset
sentences were generally constructed by first identifying properties
specific to an instance, and then determining which properties could be
worded in superset form. The greater ease of level 0' property sentences
reflects the fact that they were primary constructions.
Error data
.
The overall proportion of errors was .05. Figure 24
shows the proportion of errors for true and false sentences. The false
Insert Figure 24 about here
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set 1 sentences showed a higher error ratPK e for property sentences, and
the false set 2 sentences showe. a higher er.o. rate for superset sen-
tences. The false sentences, then, showed no overall syntactic effect
with error rate.
Figure 25 shows the treaMo™ m the proportion of errors for true
sentences at each hierarchical level. Error rates for true sentences
indicated that superset sentences were
.ore difficult than property sen-
tences in both sets. The two extreme points in Figure 25 occurred for
superset sentences. True superset level 0 sentences had a very low error
rate. The Interpretation offered earlier was that these sentences do not
really represent a sentence comprehension task to the Ss, but rather a
pattern matching task. The highest proportion of errors occurred for
true SO' sentences. This high error rate for these sentences is con-
sistent with the high RT to these sentences, indicating that these sen-
tences were difficult to process.
Insert Figure 25 about here
Discussion
The results of experiment two did not support the semantic or
syntactic hypotheses as originally stated. The semantic hypothesis pre-
dicted no difference in RT between semantically corresponding property and
superset sentences, while the syntactic hypothesis predicted that superset
sentences would have faster RTs than their semantically corresponding
property sentences. Neither hypothesis was completely supported. While
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there was no overall difference In rt between property and superset
sentences, a result supporting the septic hypothesis, there were
differences between property and superset sentences at each level of the
hierarchy. At levels 0 and 1, superset sentences had faster RTs, and at
level 0., property sentences had faster RTs. This effect Indicated that
syntactic differences influenced RT, but not in the simple way of property
sentences always having longer RTs than superset sentences, as predicted
by the syntactic hypothesis.
The following factors seemed to have influenced RT to sentences in
this study.
1. Hierarchical level. RT generally increased with hierarchical
level. This effect was expected as it had been reported by Collins and
Quillla^ (1969), and Meyer (1970), and was replicated in experiment one
of this study.
2. Lexical complexity. RT to sentences with lexically complex
nouns, verbs, or adjectives was generally higher than RT to sentences
with simpler lexical items in the predicate. This result is consistent
with Kintsch's (1972) finding that the presence of lexically complex words
increased the difficulty of paired-associate list learning.
3. Syntactic form of the sentence and nature of the information
presented. The data also indicated that certain kinds of information,
(level 0' information), were simpler to process in the property sentence
syntactic form, while other types of information (level 0 and level 1 infor-
mation), were easier to process in superset sentence syntactic form.
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4. Syntactic form. There was some indication that superset
sentences were somewhat easier than property sentences overall. Tliat is,
the presence of a lexically simple noun in the predicate of superset sen-
tences reduced RT more than the presence of a lexically simple verb or
adjective. This effect is also consistent with Kintsch's (1972) results.
This effect is very tentatively suggested.
Figure 26 shows a memory network which can account for the RT effects
obtained in this study, with some notable exceptions. The Figure shows
Insert Figure 26 about here
a two-level hierarchy about athletes. It is similar to the Collins and
Quillian (1969) network in that it starts at an SO node. The SO node has
a property specific to that noun. In this network the property at level 0
is labeled PO', rather than PO as in Collins and Quillian 's (1969) network.
The SO node is also directly associated with its SI node, and the SI node
has a higher order property directly associated with its noun.
The network in Figure 26 has four primary nodes: SO, SI, PO', and
PI. Each of these nodes is subscripted with an "s," indicating that the
primary node is a lexically simple item. The primary nodes are connected
by solid lines.
Dangling from each primary node are the lexically complex forms of
each of the lexically simple items. For example, SO'^, "is a tumbler,"
was the lexically complex form of the property, PO'g, "can tumble." The
broken line connecting the complex foiTii to the simple form is used to
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indicate that the oon^lex fo™ is not a prf^.,
1. a fo™ derived fro™ the primary node by gra^atlcal operation(.).
In Short, the nodes in Figure 26 are an atte.pt to incorporate the
RTs in the first two rows of Table 17 infr. o tl oi i/ to a single network which can
account for the ordering of the twelve RTc, tv,o •wei H s. The number in parentheses at
each primary or derived node in Figure 26 is a mean RT fro. Table 17. The
relevant cells in Table 17 have been labeled in accord with the network
in Figure 26. For example, Figure 26 shows that the RT for PO.3 sentences
was 1723 msec. This RT comes from Table 17. It was the RT to level 0-
property sentences where the property form of the sentence had a lexically
simpler predicate than the superset form of the sentence. The RT to its
derived counterpart, 30'^, was 1839 msec. This was the RT to level 0'
superset sentences, where the predicate of the property sentence was
lexically simpler than the predicate of its corresponding superset. That
is, both means are from row one of Table 17 from the colmnn headed level 0'
The network in Figure 26 can account for some of the observed RTs
in the following sense. RT to a particular sentence increases depending
upon the number of steps one must travel from- SOg to the node indicated by
the sentence type. For example, take the Pig and the Sic sentences. Pig
is two steps removed from the initial SOg node. The RT to this sentence
type was 1751 msec. Sl^, however, is two steps plus one set of grammatical
operations removed from the SOg node. Therefore, its RT should be greater
than that for the Pig, which it was. SIq had a mean RT of 1793 msec, as
indicated in Figure 26 or Table 17.
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Sl^nlla.!., the SI3 sentences are one step ™. ..o. t.e SO3 node
RT to these sentences was 1730 .sec. The Pl„ sentences wMch are
remove, rro. the SO3 no.e h. one step pX.s one set o.
.ra^at.caX opera-
tions, had a higher RT, 1870 msec.
KT 1. this network is dependent upon the number of steps between a
sentence type and the SO, node, and whether or not the sentence is derived
by grammatical operations.
There are several inadequacies in this model, however.
The most important problem with the model concerns its inability
to explain the RTs to PI, and SI, sentences. A PI, sentence is one step
plus one set of grammatical operations away from the SO, node. Its RT
was 1870 msec. An SI, sentence is two steps plus one set of grammatical
operations removed from the SO, node. Therefore, a. SI, should have a higher
RT than a PI, sentence. It did not. RT to SI, was only 1793 msec.
A second problem with the model presented in Figure 26 is that it
does not represent all the RTs in the first two rows of Table 17. There
should be twelve nodes in the network representing the twelve RTs in the
first two rows of Table 17. Figure 26 has incorporated only eight of the
sentence types. SO,, PO3, SO'3, and PO', sentence types have not yet been
accounted for in terms of a network.
An example of a POg sentence is "A legislator can legislate." Its
RT from Table 17 was 15.50 msec. The SO, would be "A legislator is a legis-
lator," with an RT of 1557 msec. (See row one of Table 17.
)
There was only one sentence used in this study which was classified
as an SO'g, "An infant is a baby." The RT to this sentence was 1567 msec.
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Its corresponding PO'^ sentence,
"An inf^^^t >. v • .c
,
im mtan is babyish," had an RT of
1889 msec. (See row two of Table 17.
)
It was not Clear to the writer how the RTs to these sentence types
can he si.pl. Incorporated Into the network. However, so.e s>:ggestlons
are offered.
First, the network he modified to explain the RTs to PO3 and SO,
sentences. RT to PO3 was slightly lower than RT to SOe, a difference of
only 7 .sec. However, the direction of the difference was consistent with
the idea that SO, is derived fro. PO3 by graMMtical operations. For these
two sentence types, the SO node is not priory. It is suggested that when
the PO for. Of the sentence is lexically simpler than the SO for., the
lexicon is entered not at a noun, but at a lexically simple verb or adjec-
tive
.
Figure 27 illustrates this suggestion. The lexicon is entered at
Insert Figure 27 about here
the node "to legislate." This node is more closely associated with a
sentence of the form "A legislator can legislate," than the sentence "A
legislator is a legislator." This network is inadequate in that it does
not specify who is doing the legislating. A network of this form, where
POg is closer to the initial node seems warranted by the finding that POg
is faster than SOq.
Furthermore, this kind of structure also seemed indicated by the fact
that SOq sentences had a much higher RT than SOg sentences. SOg sentences
Ill
had an RT of 1257 msec, in contrast to an RT of 1557 msec, for SO,.
Even though hoth sentences can he responded to as pattern matching^tasks,
the SOe had a much higher RT than SO,. The network in Figure 27 suggests
that SO, sentences are not treated as pattern matchir^ sentences, but
require more semantic processing than SOg sentences.
Another problem with this explanation is that it assumes Ss process
SO3 and SO, sentences to the extent that Ss can determine whether the words
involved are lexically simple or lexically complex. This obviously contra-
dicts the assumption (Collins and Quillian, 1969) that SO sentences are not
semantically processed, but are responded to as patterns.
Finally, there are the sentence types SO'3 and PO'e. These types are
represented by only one sentence pair. "An infant is a baby," and "An
infant is babyish." It has been suggested that this sentence pair may be
disposed of by arguing that it involves neither a property nor a superset
relationship, but a synonymous relationship between "infant" and "baby."
That is, a network of the type shown in Figure 28 is suggested. "Infant"
and "baby" are considered to be both SOg nodes, and the terms "infantile"
and "babyish" are derived from them by grammatical operation. This net-
work can only be suggested since it is based on RTs to two sentences, and
the corresponding RTs to the sentences "A baby is an infant" and "A baby
is infantile" were not obtained in this experiment.
Insert Figure 28 about here
One basic "however" about the generality of the findings seems to
be in order. The semantic content of the sentences used in experiment two
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«s lifted to occupational or social role.. TMs content was selected be-
cause Of the ease of expressing the s^e idea in two syntactic fo^s. The
ease of transfo^lng the h^an semantic content sentences „ay reflect the
flexibility With Which we categorize and recategorlze people. The content
of the semantic hierarchies used by Collins and Qullllan (1969) is not so
easily transformed into alternative sentence types. For example, the sen-
tences "A canary is a bird" and "A canary is an animal" carrot both be
changed Into property sentences. "A canary Is animate" seems fairly
reasonable, but "A canary is blrdme"( ? ) does not. Therefore, the results
a^d conclusions reported may not generalize to other semantic content areas.
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TABLE 1
Sample Set of True Sentences used by
Collins and Quillian (1969)
Hierarchical Type of rel ation
level Property Superset
Level 0 PO An oak has acorns SO An oak is an oak
Level 1 PI An oak has branches SI An oak is a tree
Level 2 P2 An oak has roots S2 An oak is a plant
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TABLE 2
False Sentences Constructed Without Reference to Level of Contradiction
used by Collins and Quillian (1969)
TvDe of it: idLIon
Property Superset
A hemlock has buckeyes A pine is barley
A poplar has thorns A juniper is grain
A dogwood is lazy A willow is grass
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TABLE 3
False Sentences Constructed With Reference to Level of
Contradiction used by Collins and Quillian (1969)
Hierarchical
Level
Type of relation
Property Superset
Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
An oak has pine cones
An elm has petals
A maple can breathe
A cedar is an elm
A birch is a flower
A spruce is an animal
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TABLE 4
sample Set of True and False Sentences from Narrow Hierarchy For.
used in Experiment One
Sentence
type
Truth value
False
PC
PI
SO
SI
A salmon is pink
A tuna can swim
A sardine is a sardine
A trout is a fish
A herring is dangerous
A goldfish can crawl
A sword fish is a flounder
A mackeral is an insect
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TABLE 5
Sample Set of True and False Sentences from Broad Hierarchy Form
used In Experiment One
Sentence
type
Truth value
True False
PO A shark is dangerous A beetle is pink
PI A snake can crawl A butterfly can swim
so A flounder is a flounder A horse is a sardine
SI An ant is an insect A bear is a fish
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TABLE 6
Analysis of Variance on Reaction Time for Correct Responses
of Experiment One
Source df m F
Order of forms (0) 1 1,1^0,891.02 0.15
Range of hierarchy (R) 1 35,595.11 0.06
Hierarchy (H) 11 910,406.06 6.47****
Type of relation (Y) 1 14,761,772.64 42.32****
Hierarchical level (L) 1 7,285,595.56 111.04****
Truth value (T) 1 7,010,580.06 46.72****
Subjects (S/0) 10 7,374,958.65
0 X R 1 7,861,014.06 14.69***
0 X H 11 270,988.27 1.93*
R X H 11 474,647.48 3.78****
0 X Y 1 0.29 <0.01
R X Y 1 43,472.25 0.39
H X Y 11 530,252.30 8.07****
0 X L 1 117,306.25 1.79
R X L 1 4,005.84 0.05
H X L 11 130,053.63 1.70
Y X L 1 1,172,347.56 6.61*
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TABLE 6 cont'd.
^ ^\ 1 1 4>* ^ Aoourcc df MS F
1 5,846,925.50 62.84***
P V TK X i 1 36,337.89 0.83
17 V Tn X 1 11 470,772.74 6.02****
10 535,054.03
w A LX / \J 110 140,675,51
10 346,712.99
O A Li / KJ 10 65,617.77
o X J. / u 10 150,059.17
n V p V uu X rv. X n 11 104,902.73 0.83
O V P V VU X J\ X 1 1 497,142.51 4.45
D v H V VA n A I 11 83,891.59 1.28
P -v P V VIX A n X 1 11 232,026.77 3.11***
O V P V TU X K X b 1 51.96 <0.01
r> V P -v Tu X n X 1j 11 107,184.42 1.40
P V U V TK X n X L 1 111 216,035.64 2.24**
0 X Y X L 1 60,598.03 0.34
R X Y X L 1 11,156.64 0.16
H X Y X L 11 169,843.50 1.76
0 X R X T 1 22,337.79 0.51
0 X H X T 11 62,409.89 0.80
TABLE 6 cont'd.
Source
R X H X T
0 X Y X T
R X Y X T
H X Y X T
0 X L X T
R X L X T
H X L X T
Y X L X T
S X R X H/0
S X R X Y/0
S X H X Y/0
S X R X L/0
S X H X L/0
S X Y X L/0
S X R X T/0
S X H X T/0
S X Y X T/0
S X L X T/0
0 X R X H X Y
0 X R X H X L
df
11
1
1
11
1
1
11
1
110
10
110
10
110
10
10
110
10
10
11
11
MS
231,442.71
531,198.03
13,953.52
215,147.41
130,652.13
12,637.51
162,067.20
1,136,089.51
125,521.34
111,714.19
65,881.51
79,286.72
76,385.91
177,392.39
43,861.62
78,265.05
285,058.39
93,046.76
67,887.89
86,505.38
2.11*
1.86
0.20
2.71***
1.40
0.10
2.00*
8.61
0.91
0.90
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TABLE 6 cont'd.
•Source df
F
0 X R X Y X L 1
0.01
0 X H X L X Y 11
1.47
R X H X Y X L 11 157 OQ'^ 9=; 1. 99*
0 X R X H X T 11 7fi ARfi AQ/ o } too % Hy 0. 72
0 X R X Y X T 1 34 518 5A 0. 50
0 X H X Y X T 11 90 QSft 1yyj y JJO • XJ 1. 14
R X H X Y X T 11 99 905 6A 1.43
0 X R X L X T 1 24.232.11 o on
0 X H X L X T 11 79 561 11 r> QQu . yy
R X H X L X T 11 236 750 82 2 . 96***
0 X Y X L X T 1 21 2'^0 Q7 0. 16
R X Y X L X T 1 143.830.56 J. 44
H X Y X L X T 11 287 .259 . 29 0 *7 0^^4
S X R X H X Y/0 110 74 .633. 78
S X R X H X L/0 110 96,442.35
S X H X Y X L/0 110 96,421.88
S X R X H X T/0 110 109,523.58
S X R X Y X T/0 10 68,808.37
S X H X Y X T/0 110 79,452.26
S X R X Y X L/0 10 69,505.19
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TABLE 6 cont'd.
Source df MS F
S X R X L X T/0 10 121,637.38
S X H X L X T/0 110 81,058.08
S X Y X L X T/0 10 131,904.02
OxRxHxYxL 11 88,093.25 1. 12
OxRxHxYxT 11 42,906.97
OxRxHxLxT 11 77,882.24 u . y /
OxRxYxLxT 1 250.71
OxHxYxLxT 11 36,027.78
RxHxYxLxT 11 128,356.84 1.73
SxRxHxYxL/0 110 78,909.98
SxRxHxYx T/0 110 69,702.17
SxRxHxLx T/0 110 79,924.83
SxRxYxLx T/0 10 41,852.81
SxHxYxLxT/0 110 105,245.38
OxRxHxYxLx T 11 110,391.89 1.49
SxRxHxYxLx T/0 110 74,152.96
*£<.05.
**£<.025.
***£<. 005.
****£<. 001.
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TABLE 8
Analysis of Variance on Reaction Time for Correct Responses
Property Relation Sentences from Experiment One
Source df MS F
Order of forms (0) 1 130,452,79 0.13
Range of hierarchy (R) 1 1,537.67 0.01
Truth value (T) 1 51,908.84 1.08
Level (L) 1 335,130.07 7. 80**
Verb phrase (V) 2 183,297.70 3.60*
Subjects (S/0) 10 1,019,811.95
0 X R 1 1,430,139.32 13.58***
0 X T 1 473,321.53 9.83**
R X T 1 1,458.59 0.12
0 X L 1 113.34 <0.01
R X L 1 357.85 0.05
T X L 1 222,426.16 15.56***
0 X V 2 20,242.87 0.40
R X V 2 75,859.91 3.05
T X V 2 42,893.11 1.27
L X V 2 36,398.46 1.30
S X R/0 10 105,301.25
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TABLE 8 cont'd.
Source df MS F
S X T/0 10 48,129.19
S X L/0 10 42,949.17
S X V/0 20 50,895.70
0 X R X T 1 312.19 0.03
0 X R X L 1 229.35 0.03
0 X T X L 1 44,195.38 3.09
R X T X L 1 21,753.68 1.12
0 X R X V 2 5,417.57 0.22
0 X T X V 2 17,589.09 0.52
R X T X V 2 3,946.98 a 10
0 X L X V 2 40,892.58 1.46
R X L X V 2 23,149.18 0.83
T X L X V 2 178,436.30 4.27*
S X R X T/0 10 11,963.54
S X R X L/0 10 7,212.76
S X T X L/0 10 14,294.26
S X R X V/0 20 24,886.65
S X T X V/0 20 33,729.05
S X L X V/0 20 27,916.43
0 X R X T X L 1 3,168.81 0.16
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TABLE 8 cont'd.
Source df no TPr
0 X R X T X V 2 n nftU . Uo
0 X R X L X V 2 n Aft
0 X T X L X V 2 \J .
R X T X L X V 2 36 885 72 Ql 80
S X R X T X L/0 10 19 365 80
S X R X T X V/0 20 38,773.21
S X R X L X V/0
S X T X L X V/0 20 41,830.90
0 X R X T X L X V 2 29,227.62 0.63
S X R X T X L X v/0 20 46,321.19
*£ < .05.
**£ < .025.
***£ < .005.
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance on Mean RTs to True and False, Prop
Superset Sentences in Experiment Two
Source at
F
Order of forms (0") 1X 2,588,138.35 1.83
Form (F) 1X 6,709.74 0.24
Truth Value (T) 1X 1,089,232.65 19.82***
Type of Relation fR") 1X 5,518.87 0.53
Subiects (^l(S\ 1,414,190.34
0 X F 1 1,759,636.11 61.89***
0 X T 11 2.67 <0.01
F X T 1X 469.50 0.07
0 X R 1X 414.48 0.04
F X R 1X 11/. I"?/114 ,174.47 12.31**
T X R 1 35,903.99 5.04*
S X F/0 22 28,430.21
S X T/0 22 54,947.60
S X R/0 22 10,441.63
0 X F X T 1 30,730.39 4.40*
0 X F X R 1 1,828.79 0.20
0 X T X R 1 2,574.89 0.36
13A
TABLE 11 cont'd.
Source
F X T X R
S X F X T/0
S X F X R/0
S X T X R/0
0 X F X T X R
S X F X T X R/0
df
1
22
22
22
1
22
MS
1,384.28
6,990.47
9,275.96
7,129.74
4,889.81
3,948.00
0.35
1.24
*£ < .05.
**£ < .005.
***£ < .001.
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TABLE 12
Analysis of Variance on Mean RTs to True Sentences at
Levels 0. 0'. and 1 in Experiment Two
Source df MS F
Order of forms (0) 1 3,760,193.77 1.78
Form (F) 1 14,390.14 0.28
Type of relation (R) 1 62,990.31 3,89*
Hierarchical level (L) 2 2,605,774.00 61. 28***
Subjects (S/0) 22 2,115,298.12
0 X F 1 2,090,489.36 40.89***
0. X R 1 693.01 0.04
F X R 1 116,109.39 7.03**
0 X L 2 78,013.98 1.83
F X L 2 22,410.98 a97
R X L 2 159»410.86 8.94***
S X F/0 22 51,121.73
S X R/0 22 16,213.73
S X L/0 44 42,524.51
0 X F X R 1 34,519.00 2.09
0 X F X L 2 61,866.15 2.69
0 X R X L 2 18,023.97 1.01
136
TABLE 12 cont'd.
Source df MS
— -
F
r X K X L 2 100,251.33 4.15**
S X F X R/0 22 16,510.14
44 23,008.75
S X R X L/0 44 17,829.70
0 X F X R X L 2 3,243.67 0.13
S X F X R X L/0 44 24,166.67
*£ < .10.
**£ < .025.
***£ < .001.
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TABLE 13
Analysis of Variance on Mean RTs to True and False, Property and
Superset Sentences for Fast and Slow Responders In Experiment Two
Source
Form (F)
Truth value (T)
Type of relation (R)
Subjects (S/M)
M X F
M X T
F X T
M X R
F X R
T X R
S X F/M
S X T/M
S X R/M
M X F X T
M X F X R
M X T X R
df MS
) 1
,y ju jUifo. 67
1 0 , /uy . 74
1
1
22
1
1
1
1 QQA no
1
1 35,903.99
22 106,667.05
22 53,830.25
22 10,415.19
1 15,289.96
1 2,443.06
1 17,728.14
40.99***
0.66
20.23***
0.53
0.36
0.46
0.06
0.10
12.35**
5.57*
1.99
0.26
2.75
TABLE 13 cont'd.
Source
F X T X R
S X F X T/M
S X F X R/M
S X T X R/M
M X F X T X R
S X F X T X R/M
df
1
22
22
22
1
22
MS
1,384.28
7,692.31
9,248.02
6,440.95
18,064.50
3,349.15
0.41
5.39
*£ < .05.
**£ < .005.
***£ < .001.
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TABLE 14
Analysis of Variance on Mean RTs to True Sentences at Levels 0, 0'.
and 1 for Fast and Slow Responders in Experiment Two
Source
MS F
Median split groups (M) 1 ^0 7^7 ^70 on 34. 63***
Form (F) 1 0.10
Type of relation (R) 1 oz ,yyu
. ji 4. 20*
Hierarchical level (L) 2 0 fini^ 77/ Qr> 59 . 68***
Subjects (S/M) 22
M X F 1X 0.12
M X R 1X
,104 . 30 1.81
F X R 1X i-io ,iuy . ly 6 . 80**
M X L 2 ^J , • xy 1.21
F X L 2 ZZ , HXU • o
/
U. o7
R X L 2 159,410.87 8.63***
D X r /M 145,328.05
S X R/M 22 15,009.09
S X L/M 44 43,660.82
M X F X R 1 22,132.87 1.30
M X F X L 2 3,143.01 0.12
M X R X L 2 4,018.94 a 22
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TABLE 14 cont'd.
Source
F X R X L
S X F X R/M
S X F X L/M
S X R X L/M
M X F X R X L
S X F X R X L/M
df
2
22
44
44
2
44
MS
100,251.33
17,073.14
25,677.98
18,466.29
61,005.09
21,541.13
4.65**
2.83
*£ < .10.
**£ < .025.
***£ < .001.
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TABLE 15
Analysis of Variance on Standard Deviation of RTs for True and
Property and Superset Sentences in Experiment Two
ouurcc df MS F
'-'^•'jct (ji ronns s'J} 1 54,529.63 0.53
Farm ( Ti''\ 1 21,692.64 2.40
Truth vfllii<» fT\ 1 12,626.13 1.21
lype or relation ^K^ 1 3,469.08 0.58
oUDjeCtS \b/U) 22 102,478.77
n V Tu X r 1 3,203.21 0.35
V T*U X 1 1 4,284.56 0.41
17 V T 1 1,145.09 0.11
0 V RW A IV i 3,172.73 0.53
17 V P •t1 70,489.26 15.35**
T X R 1 83.67 0.02
S X F/0 22 9,051.42
S X T/0 22 10,454.95
S X R/0 22 5,963.95
0 X F X T 1 73.64 0.01
0 X F X R 1 8,419.71 1.83
0 X T X R 1 8,352.57 2.11
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TABLE 15 cont'd.
Source
MS F
F X T X R 1 4,125.43 1.15
S X F X T/0 22 10,261.90
S X F X R/0
4,593.46
S X T X R/0 22 3,965.19
0 X F X T X R 1 24,388.96 6.83*
S X F X T X R/0 22 3,572.56
*£ < .025.
**£ < .001.
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TABLE 16
Analysis of Variance on Standard Deviation of RTs for True Sentences
at Levels 0, 0', and 1 in Experiment Two
Source df MS F
Order of forms (0) 1 183,163.28 1.11
Form (F) 1 14,890.92 0.48
Type of relation (R) 1 18,560.38 1.12
Hierarchical level (L) 2 182,061.91 13.83**
Subjects (S/0) 22 165,482.41
0 X F 1 5,616.32 0.18
0 X R 1 4,319.15 0.26
F X R 1 203,310.98 21.12**
0 X L 2 12,977.38 0.99
F X L 2 2,532.80 a 13
R X L 2 41,230.49 2.51*
S X F/0 22 31,342.41
S X R/0 22 16,623.39
S X L/0 44 13,163.71
0 X F X R 1 124,310.54 12.92**
0 X F X L 2 3,040.07 0.15
0 X R X L 2 39,375.31 2.39
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TABLE 16 cont'd.
Source df MS F
F X R X L 2 2,818.42 0.19
S X F X R/0 22 9,625.00
S X F X L/0 44 19,725.67
S X R X L/0 44 16,456.76
0 X F X R X L 2 2,048.62 0.14
S X F X R X L/0 44 15,154.48
*£ < .10.
**£ < .001.
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FIG. 2. Memory net model presented in Collins and Quillian (1969)
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from experiment one.
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FIG. 9. Mean proportion of errors for true and false property
relation sentences using the three different predicates from
experiment one.
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Appendix
TABLE A
Sentences Used in Replication of Collins and Quillian (1969)
Sentence
Conditions
Narrow Hierarchies
True Sentences False Sentences
PO BASEBALL HAS INNINGS SKATING HAS PAWNS
PI BADMINTON HAS RULES TENNIS IS RISKY
SO FISHING IS FISHING BOWLING IS A RA.CE
SI SOCCER IS A SPORT SWIMMING IS A TOY
PO A SHARK IS DANGEROUS A HERRING CAN CLIMB
PI A SALMON CAN SWIM A GOLDFISH CAN CRAWL
A SARDINE IS A SARDINE A LOBSTER IS A TURTLE
SI A PIKE IS A FISH A MACKERAL IS A REPTILE
PO A SUBMARINE CAN SUBMERGE A CANOE IS SUPERSONIC
PI A SCHOONER HAS A RUDDER A ROWBOAT CAN FLY
so A SAILBOAT IS A SAILBOAT A RAFT IS A HELICOPTER
SI AN OCEAN LINER IS A SHIP A YACHT IS AN AUTOMOBILE
175
TABLE A cont'd.
PO A CANARY CAN SING A DOVE CAN SPEAK
PI A WREN CAN FLY AN EAGLE IS FURRY
A ROBIN IS A ROBIN A SPARROW IS A COW
SI A PARROT IS A BIRD A PIGEON IS AN INSECT
PO A SURGEON HAS A SCALPEL A DENTIST CAN BAPTIZE
PI AN OBSTETRICIAN CAN
VACCINATE
A DERMATOLOGIST CAN
LEGISLATE
SO A NEUROLOGIST IS A
NEUROLOGIST
A PEDIATRICIAN IS A
MINISTER
A GENERAL PRACTITIONER IS
A DOCTOR
A PSYCHIATRIST IS A
POLITICIAN
PO A PEA IS GREEN BROCCOLI HAS A SHELL
PI A BEAN IS GROWN SPINACH HAS BONES
so ASPARAGUS IS ASPARAGUS A TURNIP IS A FRANKFURTER
SI A CARROT IS A VEGETABLE A CUCUMBER IS A DRINK
PO A LOCKET CAN OPEN A CUFF LINK HAS LACES
PI A NECKLACE IS ORNAMENTAL A TIE CLASP HAS A SOLE
so A RING IS A RING AN EARRING IS A DERBY
Si A BRACELET IS JEWELRY A WATCH IS A HAT
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TABLE A cont'd.
PO AN OAK HAS ACORNS A WILLOW IS RED
PI A SPRUCE HAS BRANCHES A BIRCH HAS PETALS
so A MAPLE IS A MAPLE A SYCAMORE IS A LILY
SI A CEDAR IS A TREE A REDWOOD IS A FLOWER
PO CHAMPAGNE IS SPARKLING MADEIRA IS GREEN
PI CHIANTI IS ALCOHOLIC BRANDY IS CARBONATED
so SHERRY IS SHERRY CLARET IS ROOT BEER
SI ROSE IS WINE BURGUNDY IS WHISKY
PO A KNIFE CAN CUT A STRAINER CAN FRY
PI A SPOON CAN MIX A FUNNEL HAS A PLUG
SO A FORK IS A FORK A CAN OPENER IS A SAUCER
SI A SPATULA IS A UTENSIL A CORKSCREW IS A DISH
PO SLATE IS GRAY GRANITE IS GREEN
PI A PEBBLE IS SOLID SAND IS METALLIC
so LIMESTONE IS LIMESTONE A COBBLESTONE IS A DIAMOND
SI GRAVEL IS STONE SHALE IS A GEM
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TABLE A cont'd.
PO SAUSAGE HAS SKIN A HAMBURGER HAS DRUMSTICKS
PI LAMB HAS FAT HAM CAN SPILL
so VEAL IS VEAL A SALAMI IS LETTUCE
SI PORK IS MEAT MUTTON IS FRUIT
Broad Hierarchies
PO CHESS HAS PAWNS HOCKEY HAS INNINGS
PI ROULETTE IS RISKY A TEDDY BEAR HAS RULF^
so A RACE IS A RACE BASKETBALL IS FISHING
SI A UULLnOUbti IS A TOY A PUPPET IS A SPORT
PO A MONKEY CAN CLIMB A LAMB IS DANGEROUS
PI A SNAKE CAN CRAWL A BUTTERFLY CAN SWIM
so A TURTLE IS A TURTLE A GOAT IS A SARDINE
SI AN ALLIGATOR IS A
REPTILE
A CAMEL IS A FISH
PO A JET IS SUPERSONIC A TAXI CAN SUBMERGE
PI A SPACESHIP CAN FLY A BUS HAS A RUDDER
SO A HELICOPTER IS A
HELICOPTER
A CABOOSE IS A SAILBOAT
SI A SEDAN IS AN AUTOMOBILE A TRUCK IS A SHIP
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TABLE A cont'd.
PO A MAN CAN SPEAK A TUNA CAN SING
PI A DOG IS FURRY A PIG CAN FLY
so A COW IS A COW A GIRAFFE IS A ROBIN
Si AN ANT IS AN INSECT A DEER IS A BIRD
A PRIEST CAN BAPTIZE A PREACHER HAS A SCALPEL
PI A REPRESENTATIVE CAN AN ENGINEER CAN VACCINATE
LEGISLATE
SO A MINISTER IS A MINISTER A REVEREND IS A NEUROLOGIST
SI A SENATOR IS A POLITICIAN A GOVERNOR IS A DOCTOR
A PT AM UAC A CUT7T T A RADISH IS GREEN
PI A TROUT HAS BONES JELLO IS GROWN
SO A FRANKFURTER IS A A TOMATO IS ASPARAGUS
FRANKFURTER
SI A SODA IS A DRINK AN APPLE IS A VEGETABLE
PO A SNEAKER HAS LACES A BERET CAN OPEN
Pi A SLIPPER HAS A SOLE A GALOSHE IS ORNAMENTAL
SO A DERBY IS A DERBY A STOCKING IS A RING
SI A BONNET IS A HAT A HELMET IS JEWELRY
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TABLE A cont'd.
PO A ROSE IS RED A GRAPEVINE HAS ACORNS
PI A DAISY HAS PETALS A MUSHROOM HAS BRANCHES
so A LILY IS A LILY A CACTUS IS A I4APLE
SI A BUTTERCUP IS A FLOWER A ZINNIA IS A TREE
PO LIME SODA IS GREEN COFFEE IS SPARKLING
PI SODA IS CARBONATED MILK IS ALCOHOLIC
so ROOT BEER IS ROOT BEER TEA IS SHERRY
SI BOURBON IS WHISKY SCOTCH IS WINE
PO A SKILLET CAN FRY A KETTLE CAN CUT
PI A TOASTER HAS A PLUG A REFRIGERATOR CAN MIX
so A SAUCER IS A SAUCER A BOTTLE IS A FORK
SI A PLATTER IS A DISH AN OVEN IS A UTENSIL
PO AN EMERALD IS GREEN JADE IS GRAY
PI IRON IS METALLIC OIL IS SOLID
so A DIAMOND IS A DIAMOND GOLD IS LIMESTONE
SI A RUBY IS A GEM ALUMINUM IS A STONE
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TABLE A cont'd.
PC A CHICKEN HAS DRUMSTICKS A COOKIE HAS SKIN
Pi JUICE CAN SPILL A PINEAPPLE HAS FAT
so LETTUCE IS LETTUCE A TURKEY IS VEAL
SI AN APPLE IS A FRUIT AN ONION IS MEAT
Practice Sentences
Narrow Hierarchies
PC A LIMOSINE IS LONG A JEEP CAN ORBIT
PI A STATION WAGON HAS
WHEELS
A CONVERTIBLE HAS WINGS
so A CHEVROLET IS A
CHEVROLET
A CADILLAC IS A CHARIOT
SI A CHRYSLER IS A CAR A SPORTSCAR IS A TRUCK
PO A CASHEW IS HARD AN ALMOND IS BLUE
PI A CHESTNUT HAS A SHELL A PEANUT IS SOFT
so A WALNUT IS A WALNUT A BRAZIL NUT IS A
STRAWBERRY
SI A PECAN IS A NUT A HAZEL NUT IS A VINE
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TABLE A cont'd.
Broad Hierarchies
PO A PINE TREE HAS PINE
CONES
A BEET IS YELLOW
PI A WILLOW HAS BARK A CYPRESS HAS GRAPES
so AN ELM IS AN ELM AA rALU iKlit, ib A GARDENIA
SI A BIRCH IS A TREE A TOADSTOOL IS A FLOWER
PO A LION HAS A MANE A SPARROW IS LARGE
PI A CROCODILE IS SCALY A GOLDFISH HAS FUR
so A CROW IS A CROW A KANGAROO IS A BULLDOG
SI A CHEETAH IS A CAT A FROG IS A DOG
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